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RONALD REAGAN AND THE PRESIDENTIAL
IMPERATIVE TO STYLIZE: A - E = <GC*
Ronald H. Carpenter
As depicted in a recent editorial cartoon, someone said "It looks like
Jimmy Carter is maneuvering himself to become spokesman for the Dem
ocratic Party"; and another person retorted, "That's funny—that's some
thing he could never do as President."' Mr. Carter had a problem: although
we elected him after Watergate mainly because of his promise "I will never
lie to you," we were not as eager to reeled Mr. Carter, in part, because as
President he could not say well what Americans wanted said well. Coming
to the presidency with communication liabilities such as unnatural pause
patterns (which he overcame to a large extent) and tendencies toward slips
of the tongue (embarrassingly near "live" microphones), Mr. Carter also was
not eloquent in statements to fulfill what I call for the latter twentieth-
century "the presidential imperative to stylize." And as the 1980 presiden
tial campaign evolved, jimmy Carter stood in contrast to Ronald Reagan
who evinced potential to be our great communicator.
For all of his poised and polished delivery (acf/o), however, Mr. Reagan
likely will be deemed our less-than-great communicator after all; and I base
that prediction upon my critical reading of style (eJocut/o) in his Inaugural
Address. Before the inauguration, though, Americans knew Mr. Reagan de
livered lines well. Recall an actor's timing in his Acceptance Address per
oration at the Republican Convention: "I'll confess that I've been a little
afraid to suggest what I'm going to suggest, [beat] I'm more afraid not to.
[beat] Can we begin our crusade joined together in a moment of silent
prayer?" But in inaugural addresses, Americans expect more than mere
finesse in delivery; and President Reagan was unable to achieve therein that
eloquence in statement to place him among predecessors accorded acclaim
and political power because, as our surrogate spokespersons, their style said
well what we wanted said well.
As bases for understanding that stylistic imperative of recent presidents,
consider briefly how a vocal if not oratorical people in the nineteenth cen
tury became a nation of more passive readers and listeners in the latter
twentieth-century, often accepting proudly membership in a "great silent
majority." Yesterday, we participated and spoke in varied assemblies, from
town meeting to Grange hall, knowing that in these vital forums our dis
course influenced others. Today, we more likely read from 1,750 daily news-
Ronald H. Carpenter is Associate Professor of English at the University of
Florida. This essay was presented at the Fourth Annual Conference on Dis
course Analysis, "Form and Genre in Political Discourse," Temple Univer
sity, March 17-19, 1983.
• The poise and polish of delivery (Acf/o) minus the ability to stylize (E/ocuf/o) equal
a Less-Than-Great Communicator.
' Ca/nesv/i/e Sun, 30 August 1981, p. 4A.
SPEAKER AND GAVEL, Vol. 20 (1982-83), 1-6.
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2  SPEAKER AND GAVEL
papers printing over 63,000,000 copies per day or still more likely listen to
6,500 radio stations reaching us through 300,000,000 radio sets (or 3 radios
for every 2 Americans) or view television sets now present in more than
98% of American homes. And many Americans now say with complete
conviction "Unaccustomed as I am to public speaking .. . Our reticence
also is compounded by a paucity of compositional skills, an inability with
language and literacy approaching a national crisis. Recall how after Sputnik
in 1957 our educational system was reoriented. To catch up to Russia's
presumed technological superiority, our schools stressed math and sci
ences—often at the expense of writing skills which are foundations of an
articulate citizenry. But if we ourselves are not eloquent, our impulse is to
support political leaders who are. Consider as Everyman Archie Bunker,
surely a member in good standing of Richard Nixon's "great silent majority."
In one episode of "All in the Family," Archie opposed gun-control; a tele
vision editorial caused him to visit the station and complain; but when given
equal air time and a platform to voice his position, Archie was inarticulate.
Imagine a reticent Archie Bunker, though, hearing approvingly Vice-Presi-
dent Agnew's seemingly clever alliterations about "pussilanimous pussy-
footers" or "nattering nabobs of negativism" and responding to Edith from
his armchair with a resounding, Middle America counterpart of "Right on
Spiro.'"
In America's recent, collective consciousness, a sense of style resides at
several levels. Through electronic mass media, we heard—and learned—
Franklin Roosevelt's traductio "We have nothing to fear but fear Itself" or
the auxes/s "To some generations much is given; of other generations much
is expected; this generation of Americans has a rendezvous with destiny."
Yes, sometimes we overlook a lack of presidential style in discourse. As the
strongest nation emerging from World War Two, America was content with
tough talk in the mode of "give 'em hell Harry" Truman. We also forgave
□wight Eisenhower's stylistic ineptness (and parodied how he might have
written the Gettysburg Address, beginning "I haven't checked the figures
but eighty-seven years ago, I think it was .. ."). From the architect of D-Day
and Victory in Europe, publicized in 1952 as "General" Eisenhower, the
campaign slogan "I shall go to Korea" was enough for a nation weary of war
in Asia. Moreover, a military man of deeds was an appropriate counterpoint
to Adiai Stevenson, a man of words seemingly preoccupied with stylistic
overkill. As depicted in an editorial cartoon of that time, Stevenson stood
pencil and paper in hand requesting of an aide with Webster's Unabridged
Dictionary "Pick me ten big words that have four synonyms each. I must
make a speech and I do not wish to be understood."^ A paramessage in
Stevenson's style said "egghead."
After Eisenhower, John Kennedy's eloquence reassured us; presidents still
could be surrogate spokespersons articulating well our hopes and fears for
the future. And if Richard Nixon's subsequent, blatant attempts to copy
' For the broader statement of my position, see Ronald H. Carpenter, "The Sym
bolic Substance of Style in Presidential Discourse," Style, 16 (Winter 1982), 38-49.
^ Reprinted in Marcus Cuniiffe, The American Heritage History of the Presidency
(American Heritage Publishing Company, 1968), p. 164.
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Kennedy style were not obtrusive to us, credit our recognition that the man
of humble origins, modest circumstances and "Checkers" at least knew what
model to imitate, as In "If we are to have respect for law in America we
must have laws that deserve respect" or "Let each of us ask not just what
will government do for me but what can I do for myself." President Carter,
though, neither imitated eloquent style in discourse nor originated it. So
Ronald Reagan's imperative to stylize should have been all the stronger to
fill the void, but his Inaugural Address portended presidential style equally
inept.
Mr. Reagan favored anaphora, beginning successive clauses or sentences
with the same word or phrase (as In Lincoln's "With malice toward none,
with charity for all, with firmness in the right.. The efficacy of repetition
for emphasis is axiomatic. People do learn and remember what is repeated—
particularly in stylized statements. We quoted easily Martin Luther King's
"I have a dream" because seven consecutive sentences began with that
phrase; we believed that England would fight on in the dark days after
Dunkirk because Churchill repeated "we shall fight on the beaches, we shall
fight on the landing grounds, we shall fight in the fields and in the streets,
we shall fight in the hills " Those repeated words deserve being remem
bered. In speaking of "the will and moral courage of free men and women,"
however, Mr. Reagan says "It is a weapon our adversaries in today's world
do not have. It is a weapon that we as Americans do have."^ Discounting
grammar by which the plural "will and moral courage" become the singular
"it," the phrase "it is"—despite repetition —is unworthy of memorability.
Mr. Reagan also squanders stylized repetion elsewhere on the same impo
tent phrase, "It is no coincidence that our present troubles parallel . ... It
is time for us to realize .. or he repeats in parallel a neutral word as in
"it distorts our economic decisions /f threatens to shatter the lives of
millions," when the more emotionally charged phrase is his referent, "one
of the worst sustained inflations in our national history." Even for more
potent words reminiscent of Kennedy constructions, Mr. Reagan "buries"
repeated phrases which could have been bases for more salient parallelism:
"So, with all the creative energy at our command let us begin an era of
national renewal. Let us renew our determination, our courage, and our
strength. And let us renew our faith and hope."
Of course any stylistic comparison of Reagan to Kennedy must appraise
antitheses. People still recall easily those particularly epigrammatic lines such
as "Let us never negotiate out of fear, but let us never fear to negotiate" or
the more ubiquitous "Ask not what your country can do for you—ask what
you can do for your country." President Reagan's attempt at this stylistic
form (often called urbanitas in traditional theory but what I teach as an AB/
BA reversal) is not as well balanced: "All of us—all of us need to be reminded
that the Federal Government did not create the states; the slates created
the Federal Government." Although not many Americans know the line is
from Lucius Q. Lamar, the statement's greater problem is that to be mean
ingful—and hence quotable—listeners are forced to recall (if they can) our
•This text is as published originally in Vital Speeches, 15 February 1981, pp. 258-
260.
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historical progression from Articles of Confederation to United States Con
stitution. Similarly, to epitomize what "makes us special among the nations
of the earth," Mr. Reagan says "We are a nation that has a government-
net the other way around." People are not likely to quote lines which they
themselves must reword mentally to gain their import. But Kennedy's an
titheses are meaningful, instantly, standing alone.
President Reagan's antitheses pose another problem stylistically. An axiom
for making many antitheses resides in lyrics for Johnny Mercer's song rec
ommending "you gotta accentuate the positive." Adiai Stevenson said of
Eleanor Roosevelt, "When other people cursed the darkness she lit a can
dle." Ending on the upbeat, the line emphasizes by position the positive
(and recency may have advantage over primacy). Suppose he had said "She
lit a candle when other people cursed the darkness." The admirable action
is not emphasized by position, as in Kennedy's most quoted lines or even
his other antitheses such as "not a victory of party but a celebration of
freedom" or "not from the generosity of the state but from the hand of
Cod." Mr. Reagan ignores possibilities in placement, though, when he says
"We must act today in order to preserve tomorrow." To emphasize urgen
cy, the better line might be "To preserve tomorrow we must act today."
Or consider this sequence about "government"; "It is rather to make it
work—work with us, not over us; to stand by our side, not ride our back."
Why not "government which works not over us but with us; not riding our
backs but standing by our side"?
In a classical treatise, Demetrius posited a desideratum of style, "Length
dissolves vehemence." Or, to convey emotion and depth of feeling, use
more terse forms, such as asyndeton (omitting conjunctions as in "I came;
1 saw; I conquered"). Mr. Reagan asks, "Can we solve the problems con
fronting us? Well the answer is an unequivocal and emphatic yes." Actually,
the emphatic and unequivocal answer would have been the most terse
statement possible: standing alone, the simple "Yes." But Mr. Reagan is
fond of adding words, particularly an introductory and stylistically inept
"well" to his sentences: "Well, our concern must iae for a special interest
group ..."; or "Well, this administration's objective will be a healthy...
economy..."; or "Well I believe we the Americans of today are ready to
act " From the standpoint of delivery, interjecting "well" provides Mr.
Reagan with verbal filler to accompany his oft rehearsed nod of the head
with clenched teeth and pursed lips—typically to stage right. Stylistically,
though, a colloquial "well" reduces what might have been lofty, elevated
expression to friendly advice offered in a "B" motion picture. The same is
true for contractions in "it's not my intention," "we're in a time ... they
just don't know," "they're on both sides," or "I've just taken."
From an academician, a consideration of presidential style ought at least
raise this question: can discourse be eloquent when it does not rely on
complete sentences? Mr. Reagan's Inaugural Address too often embodies
clusters of words between two periods but without predicates, passing off
as sentences "This breed called Americans," "A man of humility who came
to greatness reluctantly," "Off to one side, the stately memorial to Thomas
Jefferson," or "And then beyond the Reflecting Pool, the dignified columns
of the Lincoln Memorial." Perhaps a question about formal grammar is too
8
Speaker & Gavel, Vol. 20, Iss. 1 [1983], Art. 1
https://cornerstone.lib.mnsu.edu/speaker-gavel/vol20/iss1/1
SPEAKER AND GAVEL 5
academic, however, when analyzing pragmatic functions of style in dis
course. So this final consideration is in order.
Americans often learn catchphrases which epitomize a presidency. Yes,
Lyndon Johnson's "Great Society" deteriorated to a "Credibility Gap," but
Franklin Roosevelt's metaphor of a "New Deal" likely holds a record for
longevity as presidential style in usage. And John Kennedy's metaphorical
"New Frontier" caught the imagination of a generation of erstwhile west
erners who, before becoming urban cowboys, would emulate their pioneer
forebears and "meet any hardships .... explore the stars, conquer the des
erts" and engage in other atavistically appealing social endeavors, albeit
wielding textbooks and stethoscopes in lieu of axes and muskets. But poor
Mr. Reagan. If the quotation marks are an index of intentions, he had hopes
for a "new beginning." We were not impressed, for nothing unique was
expressed. Any beginning has some newness. Put simply, tautology does
not conduce to catchphrases. And as America ended 1983, no stylized state
ment epitomized favorably what President Reagan has done or will do. (Ob
viously, I exclude the controversial word "Reaganomics.")
By the time Mr. Reagan was ready to announce formally his bid for reelec
tion, these preferences for presidential style in discourse were established
firmly. Consider his State of the Union Address of 25 January 1984, virtually
three years to the day after his inauguration. In both its televised delivery
and the official published text, the speech admittedly evinces strong like
lihood that portions were extemporized—or that the President's customary
efficacy in handling a script did not manifest itself fully.' But stylistic ten
dencies characteristic of 1981 persist.
The President still retained hopes for a tautological catchphrase, "Amer
icans were ready to make a new beginning, and together we have done it"
(although he has not gained as much advantage out of "new" as Gary Hart
did during the primaries).* The address also relied extensively on the re
peated contractions, "we're," "it's," and "we'll," which reduce elevated
expression to colloquial conversation. Hints of a developing sense of style
appear, however, with an auxesis about "the heritage of one person, party,
or even generation" or these anaphoras: "We have no territorial ambitions.
We occupy no countries. We build no walls to lock people in" or "We can
insure steady economic growth. We can develop America's next frontier.
We can strengthen our traditional values." Nevertheless, eloquence does
not evolve from the continued conversational fillers, "Well, I think .. ." or
"Now, I believe there is .. ."—despite any visual impact of an accompanying
facial pose to stage right. Nor can rhetorical advantage likely accrue from
impotent words in lieu of their connotative counterparts; "Nowhere is this
more important" rather than "sparkling economy" or "It demands inter
national attention" rather than "state-sponsored terrorism." And Mr. Rea
gan continues to ignore paramessage possibilities in brev/fas. "Sooth our
' See the transcript published in Week/y CompiJat/on of Presidential Documents, 20
(30 January 1984), 87-94.
* President Reagan also evinced his affection for these words in his announcement
of a bid for reelection: "We have made a new beginning." See WCPD. 20 (6 February
1984), 114-115.
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sorrow, heal our wounds, calm our fears, and share our joy" could be artic
ulated with asyndeton; and any erstwhile critic of style might ruminate prof
itably about other options for this line: "We are first; we are best; and we
are so because we're free."
The absence of a mature sense of style is most evident, however, in Mr.
Reagan's continued abuse of antitheses. These still emphasize the negative
by position: "You inspire us as a force for freedom, not for despotism; and,
yes, for peace, not conquest." Similarly, "The future is best decided by
ballots, not bullets" would accentuate the positive more effectively as "The
future is decided best not by bullets but ballots" (in this context consider
as well other possibilities for Mr. Reagan's "so personal tax rates could come
down, not go up" or "protecting victims is just as important as safeguarding
the rights of defendants"). Of course the ultimate in effectiveness for an
titheses is the quotable catchphrase. To epitomize that "spirit of enterprise"
which presumably characterizes his administration, the President makes an
antithesis about "small businesspeople with big ideas"—and buries it in a
sentence of 56 words in length. Who could quote it? So for all his strengths
in delivering a line (acf/o), Ronald Reagan is deficient in deciding upon its
style (e/ocuf/o).
In conclusion, I offer an observation about presidential speechwriters.
Any suasory impact of Mr. Reagan's style—or lack thereof—is as that lan
guage is heard, read, and repeated In the mass media—regardless of whose
pen it flowed from originally. As President of the United States, Mr. Reagan
has sufficient "star" quality to exercise "artistic approval" for any "script"
from which he delivers lines. Assume my prediction Is accurate, that he will
be deemed our less-than-great communicator after all because of deficien
cies in style. The imperative to stylize was his to fulfill as he chose.
10
Speaker & Gavel, Vol. 20, Iss. 1 [1983], Art. 1
https://cornerstone.lib.mnsu.edu/speaker-gavel/vol20/iss1/1
GENERAL WILLIAM TECUMSEH SHERMAN
PRECEDES HENRY W. GRADY
Nicholas M. Cripe
On the evening of December 11, 1886, the New England Society of New
York held its eighty-first annual dinner at Delmonico's, one of New York
City's finest restaurants. That this was no ordinary occasion is testified to by
the front page coverage given the event the following morning by three of
the city's leading newspapers, the New York Tribune, the New York Times,
and the New York World. All three went into great detail describing the
facilities, the audience, and the events of the evening.
The Times describing the large attendance, said: "They turned out in large
numbers and filled Delmonico's big dining room until it was absolutely
uncomfortable."'
Robert Oliver describes the New England Society of New York as "ultra-
conservative" and the audience that evening as being composed of "three
hundred top-flight financiers and business leaders."^
This December 22 meeting was and is unique. For the first time in its
eighty-one years, the society had invited a Southerner, Henry W. Grady,
thirty-six year old editor of the Atlanta Consf/(u(/on, to be its principal speak
er. The title of his speech, "The New South."
That Henry W. Grady gave a noteworthy speech at Delmonico's that eve
ning has long been testified to by rhetorical scholars.' But what long has
been ignored by scholars is the fact that another excellent speaker spoke
immediately preceding Grady. The tenor of his remarks and the audience's
response to them could have only created a difficult speaking situation for
a speaker from Atlanta, Georgia. The speaker was General William Tecum-
seh Sherman and says the New York World of the audience's response to
his speech: "There was plenty of cheering when the General got through,
which came to a climax when all the old and young New Englanders got up
and lustily sang, 'Marching Through Georgia,'"'
This writer thinks it odd that though generations of American Public Ad
dress students have studied Grady's famous speech, none have analyzed
Sherman as a speaker or the speech he delivered preceding Grady that
Nicholas M. Cripe is Professor of Speech Emeritus at Butler University.
' New York Tribune, December 23, 1886, p. 1.
' Robert T. Oliver, Public Speaking in America (Bostont Allyn and Bacon, Inc., 1965),
p. 350.
'A. Craig Baird, American Public Addresses, 1740-1952 {New York: McGraw-Hill
Book Co., 1956), p. 180. Brigance, ed.. History and Criticism of American Public Address,
Vol. I (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc., 1943), p. 388. J. Louis Campbell III, "In
Search of the New South" The Southern Speech Communication Journal, XLVll (Sum
mer, 1982), No. 4, pp. 361-374.
" New York World, December 23, 1886. "Marching Through Georgia," a blood tin
gling tune commemorating Sherman's victorious campaign through Georgia had
quickly become a hit tune and for years was used frequently to salute the hero of
that Northern success.
SPEAKER AND GAVEL, Vol. 20 (1982-83), 7-12.
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8  SPEAKER AND GAVEL
December evening In New York. This paper will attempt to remedy that
oversight by assessing Sherman's speaking generally and his New England
Society speech specifically.
Genera! William Tecumseh Sherman was, from the capture of Vicksburg
in 1863 until his death in 1891, one of this country's greatest heroes and
most popular citizens. Sherman's continued popularity as a military hero
following the Civil War led to numerous invitations to speak, many of which
he accepted. His resultant popularity as a speaker grew to such an extent
that by 1885 Sherman was receiving an average of one definite invitation a
day as solicitations came from all over the North and West.^ Lloyd Lewis, in
what is considered the definitive biography of Sherman, says, "Sherman,
during the 1870's and 80's, was seen and heard by more people than any
other American of his time."®
Some idea of the popularity of Sherman as a person and as a speaker can
be seen in the many newspaper reports on Sherman speeches. In report
after report we find comments about the spontaneous and rousing recep
tion of Sherman by the audience, before, during, and at the conclusion of
his speeches. For instance, at the New England Society dinner, the Tribune,
reporting on Sherman's speech, headed that section "General Sherman
Heartily Received" and went on to report, "General Sherman was visibly
affected by the enthusiastic greeting which saluted him when he rose to
respond."'
Nor were the cheers for Sherman only before he spoke. We have already
described the response the audience gave Sherman when he concluded his
little talk at the New England Society dinner. This response was the rule and
not the exception, a conclusion arrived at from studying some thirty other
Sherman speech presentations.
Not only did audiences respond to Sherman prior to and upon conclud
ing his speeches, they responded to him frequently during the speech.
Again, using the New England Society talk as a typical example, the New
York Tribune has some twenty indications of (applause), (laughter), (laughter
and applause) interspersed through the transcript of the speech. A situation
typical of transcriptions of other Sherman speeches read by this writer.
Several things contributed to Sherman's long success as a public speaker
and popular public figure. First, and foremost, was the high concept the
American public had of this man. At a time when many former military
leaders were lending their names to all sorts of ventures and seeking polit
ical offices of all degrees, Sherman was not. The public knew, for instance,
that when several leaders at the 1884 Republican National Convention were
trying to pressure Sherman to let his name be put into nomination, and his
knowing that if it would be he would probably be nominated by acclama
tion, Sherman responded to these appeals with his famous telegram, "I will
not accept if nominated, and will not serve if elected ...."®
' Lloyd Lewis, Sherman: Fighting Prophet (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1932),
pp. 631-632.
Lewis, pp. 631-632.
' New York Tribune, December 23, 1886, p. 2.
" W. T. Sherman, Personal Memoirs of Gen. W. T. Sherman, 4th ed. Vol. II (New York:
Charles L. Webster & Co., 1891), p, 466.
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Hart says of Sherman during the middle and late 1880's, "His untarnished
Laurels had ... given him a unique position in the affections of his country
men, and the distinction of being the most revered and best beloved man
of his time
Sherman's appearance probably added to the people's belief in and their
great liking for this man. The New York Times presented the General this
way: . . He stood as straight as an arrow ... his personality is one that
commands respect and reverence. The very wrinkles in his fine old face
add to its power. In repose, his countenance is severe, with its crown of
disheveled, thin and dead brown hair and its fringe of short, stubby, gray
whiskers cut into imposing grimness. But when he smiles, the face lights up
wonderfully and there comes a twinkle in his eyes that is delightfully inviting
to confidence ...
As to the delivery of his speeches, Sherman was not the typical orator of
his day. Writing his fiancee shortly before their marriage in 1850, he stated
he was "not naturally fitted for public speaking" as then practiced, that he
had, in fact, acquired "A contempt for the bombast and stuff that form the
chief constituents of Modern Oratory."" But just as he was to develop his
own style of fighting a war which differed from that practiced by other
warriors of his day, so he developed his own concept of a public speaker
and practiced it with great success.
Very early Sherman seems to have decided that the purpose of speaking
was to be understood by the audience. Just prior to the Civil War, Sherman
was the first superintendent of the Louisiana Seminary of Learning and Mil
itary Academy (now Louisiana State University). Sherman had no patience
with faculty members who seemed unwilling or unable to bring their lec
tures down to the plane of comprehension of their students. After listening
to one of his professors talk to the student body "as he might have talked
to the faculty and seniors of Harvard," Sherman said of the talk, "Every
damned shot went clear over their heads."" On the other hand, Sherman's
students remembered his lectures as "clear, instructive, and often original
presentations.""
In the conclusion to Sherman's Memoirs, the editors had this comment
on Sherman as a public speaker: "... he developed remarkable power as
an after-dinner speaker, and when asked the secret of this success simply
said, 'Never speak long, go straight to the point; talk, do not make a speech;
never be sarcastic.'""
W. Fletcher Johnson, an early biographer of Sherman, says: "His speeches
were always brisk, spicy, and enlivened by anecdotes and reminiscence.""
Chauncey DePew, commenting on Sherman as a speaker, said: "I don't
'Sir B. H. Leddell Hart, Sherman: Soldier, Realist, American (Westport, CT: Green
wood Press, Inc. Reprinted 1978), p. 466.
'"New York T7mes, February 9, 1890, p. 5.
" Hart, p. 16.
" Hart, p. 53.
" Hart, p. 53.
" Sherman, p. 471.
W. Fletcher Johnson, Ufe of Wm. Tecumseh Sherman (N. P. Edgewood Publishing
Company, 1891), p. 466.
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10 SPEAKER AND GAVEL
believe that he ever made the slightest preparation, but absorbed, appar
ently while thinking and while carrying on a miscellaneous conversation
with those about him, the spirit of the occasion ...
As correct as DePew seems to have been about Sherman's adapting to
the spirit of the occasion, he was not correct about Sherman never prepar
ing his speech prior to the occasion. Though many of his speeches were
obviously impromptu, others were delivered extemporaneously after some
prior thought, and there are several reports of his using a manuscript.
The Indianapolis News for June 3, 1886, reports: "He read from manu
script, prefacing It with a few extemporaneous remarks...
According to the Indianapolis Journal, reporting on the same address,
Sherman, in his opening remarks to the audience, said: "I would infinitely
prefer to speak to you fresh from my heart, but I am so apt to repeat the
same old story as I am called upon so often, that in my office I sit down that
which seem to me are appropriate."^® Similar comments were found in
several other Sherman speeches.
Obviously though Sherman preferred to speak from the heart, he did
frequently give prior thought to the speech, even to the extent of preparing
manuscripts.
As to the delivery of these speeches, while there are numerous reports
of Sherman speeches, there are very few clues given as to the quality of
Sherman's speaking voice or his use of gestures. We find that in a Louisville,
Kentucky, speech "his voice was low but carried far."" At West Point, "The
remarks of the old warrior were few, but every word he uttered was eagerly
caught by his hearers."^" We are told that he expressed his words with
"directness and vigor."^'
As to his platform gestures, they "were those of the conversationalist—
not graceful and polished but quick, ungraceful, even odd at times."" At
other limes the gestures were noticeable by their absence: "General Sher
man then rose, thrust his hands deep into his pockets, and made a speech
to the boys which was interrupted at almost every sentence with demon
strations of applause.""
Sherman's delivery was obviously well adapted to capture for Sherman,
the speaker, the respect and admiration the audience had for Sherman, the
man and hero. There are just too many instances reported of the response
he would receive from his audience to believe otherwise.
Having familiarized ourselves with the occasion, the audience, and the
speaker, let us now examine Sherman's speech at the eighty-first annual
dinner of the New England Society of New York.
There are variations in the four texts of the speech available to the writer.
Lewis, pp. 631-632.
" Indianapolis News, June 3, 1886, p. 1.
" Indianapolis Journal, June 3, 1886, p. 4.
" Lewis, pp. 584-585.
New York Times, October 4, 1889, p. 1.
Johnson, p. 589.
" W. F. G. Shanks, "Recollections of Sherman," Harper's New Monthly Magazine,
XXX (April, 1865), p. 642.
" New York Times, November 19, 1883, p. 5.
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but none so serious as to create any major questions as to the overall gist
and effect of the speech. For instance, that this particular speech was def
initely not delivered from manuscript is substantiated in ail four texts, though
three differ as to exactly what the speaker did say in this regard.
The New York Times has him saying: "I hope that the words I am about to
utter may be received in a kindly spirit, be they what they may. The call
was a sudden one. I have no reply to the toast prepared. I am a rover and
will not be tied down to text or formula . .. The New York Tribune text
has him saying, ".. . and I hope the words I now say will be received in the
kindly spirit they are made in, be they what they may, for the call upon me
is sudden and somewhat unexpected. I have no toast. I am a loafer. I can
choose to say what I may—not tied by any text or formula."" Interestingly,
the text in Modern Eloquence has but two deviations from the Tribune text,
one being, instead of "I am a loafer," it says, as does the Times, "I am a
rover."" However, the prior language, the words following, and the manner
in which they are structured and punctuated are as those of the Tribune.
We can conclude that the speech Sherman delivered that evening was not
read from a manuscript.
The speech, being about 2,000 words in length, followed Sherman's fre
quently expressed prescript that speeches should be short. Taking into con
sideration that Sherman was noted as a quick thinker and rapid speaker,
and even allowing for the numerous bursts of laughter and applause, the
speech probably did not run over fifteen minutes.
This speech is typical of many of Sherman's speeches in that It has a
definite opening section adapted to the audience and occasion that creates
good will for the speaker. The body, consisting of about half the speech, is
built around an entertaining little narrative drawn from the war, following
which he concludes the speech on an inspirational note while again relating
directly to the audience. As seemed frequently to be the case in a Sherman
speech, the purpose of this talk was to create good will and entertain while
at the same time appeal to the loyalty and pride of country of the audience.
Sherman opened his remarks with the formal salutation, "Mr. President
and Gentlemen of the New England Society of New York," immediately
complimented the preceding speaker. Reverend Dr. Talmidge, on having
"drawn a glorious picture of war in language stronger than even I or my
friend. General Schofield, could dare to use," then quickly established rap
port with the audience and drew laughter and applause saying, "But looking
over the Society tonight—so many young faces here, so many old and loved
ones gone—I feel almost as one of your Forefathers." He commented on
his two decades close relationship and warm feelings for the society, drew
a few more laughs commenting on events of the previous evening with
which many in the audience were familiar, stated, as we have already noted,
that the toast to which he had been called upon to respond was unexpected
and moved into the body of the speech with these words:
" New York Times, December 23,1886, p. 2.
" New York Tribune, December 23, 1886, p. 2.
" Modern Eloquence, After Dinner Speeches, P-Z, Vol. Ill (The University Society,
1900), p. 1052.
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My friends, I have had many, many experiences, and it always seems to
me easier to recur to some of them when I am on my feet, for they come
back to me like the memory of a dream, pleasant to think of. And now,
tonight, I know the Civil War is uppermost in your minds, although I would
banish it as a thing of trade, something too common of my calling; yet 1 know
it pleases the audience to refer to little incidents here and there of the great
Civil War, in which I took a humble part. (Applause is here inserted in the
transcripts).
Then followed a narrative of an incident during the war that took place on
a plantation near Milledgeville, Georgia, between Sherman and the slave-
holding plantation owner. Sherman was an excellent story-teller, the audi
ence enjoyed the telling thoroughly, frequently laughing during the reciting
of the incident. Sherman concluded the narrative to laughter and applause
with these words: "And so I saw one reconstructed man in the good State
of Georgia, before I left it."
His talk then took on a sombre note as he justified the participation of
the North in a terrible war it did not want, a war, he told his audience,
forced upon "kindly men ... who did not want to kill... by men influenced
by a bad ambition; not by men who owned the slaves, but by politicians
who used that as a pretext, and forced you and your fathers and me and
others who sit near me to take up arms and settle the controversy once and
forever." Following cries of "good" and loud applause. General Sherman
quickly concluded his presentation by once again relating to the audience
and occasion and himself to them.
He began by saying: "Now, my friends of New England, we all know what
your ancestors are recorded to have been; mine were of the same stock."
A few words followed about his Connecticut forebears, his New England
inspired education prior to his entering West Point and then these con
cluding words, language that ended the speech on a high note of emotional
appeal: "... 1 hope that you, sons of New England, will ever stand by your
country and its flag, glory in the achievements of your ancestors, and for
ever—and to a day beyond forever, if necessary, giving you time to make
the journey to your last resting place—honor your blood, honor your fore
fathers, honor yourselves, and treasure the memories of those who have
gone before you."
The response to this speech was prolonged applause, the orchestra In the
balcony spontaneously struck up "Marching Through Georgia," and the
audience came to its feet and enthusiastically joined in singing this emo
tionally charged tune.
General Sherman must have enjoyed delivering speeches, he gave so many
"his friends accused him of keeping a carpetbag packed so he could leave
at an instant's notice upon invitation to address an audience."^' It seems
obvious also that what he said in those speeches and how he said it was well
adapted to and heartily approved of by his audiences. A fact that would be
testified to by Henry W. Grady of Atlanta, Georgia, who arose to speak at
that historic eighty-first annual dinner of the New England Society of New
York with "Marching Through Georgia" still ringing in his ears.
^Encyclopedia Britannica, 16 (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1981), p. 670.
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THE COURTS OF REASON AND LAW:
A COMPARATIVE MODEL
Dean Fadely
Publications within the fields of law and speech communication are re
plete with information, advice, and opinions extolling the virtues of speech
communication courses in general, and experience in the area of argumen
tation and debate in specific, as excellent training for the potential attorney.^
While I believe that most of this material is fundamentally sound, it is obvious
that many students who attend law school are dissatisfied with their learning
experiences. This is frequently true of one particular group of individuals—
intercollegiate debaters. Upon their arrival at law school they often find that
the debating done there (moot court activities, mock trial work, trial ad
vocacy courses, etc.) bears little resemblance, beyond some superficial sim
ilarities of form,^ to the debating which they did at the undergraduate level.
To some, this finding comes as a relief. To others, who attend law school
because they like the challenge, clash, and competition of intercollegiate
debate, and see law school as its logical continuation, it is a disappointment.
There are vast and fundamental differences between the processes which
take place in the court of reason and the process which takes place in the
Dean Fadely is Associate Professor of Speech and chairperson of the pre
law program at the University of North Carolina at Greensboro.
' For example, see: John F. Dobbyn, So You Want To Co To Law School (St. Paul,
Minn.: West Publishing Company, 1976), pp. 52-55. Rennard Strickland, How to Get
into Law School (New York: Hawthorn Books, 1974), pp. 68-77. Communication Careers
(Annandale, Va.: Association for Communication Administration). Law Schools and
Professional Education: Report and Recommendat/ons of the Special Committee for a
Study of Legal fducation of the American Bar Association (Chicago: American Bar As
sociation Press), p. 116. Pre Law Hand Book (Washington, D.C.: Association of Amer
ican Law Schools and the Law School Admission Council, 1982-83).
' American intercollegiate academic debates are structured very simiiarly to legal
debates. There are two sides, the affirmative, whose basic duty is to uphold or affirm
the resolution being debated, and the negative, whose basic duty is to deny or negate
the resolution being debated. Thus, at the outset of an academic debate, the burden
of proof normally rests with the affirmative; presumption normally rests with the
negative. In order to fulfill its burden of proof, the affirmative team has to overturn
presumption through the presentation of a pnma (acre case. The similarities between
this structure and both civil and criminal litigation are obvious. Somewhat less ob
vious, especially to the layperson, are the similarities between academic debate and
administrative law. Here too, however, the structure is highly analagous. For example,
in discussing the case of Hall v. Harris Stan Allen writes: "A claimant for social security
disability insurance benefits bears the burden of proving a disability. Once the claim
ant makes a prima facie showing of a physical impairment which effectively precludes
him from returning to his past work, the burden of going forward shifts to the Sec
retary of Health and Human Services. From: Stan Allen. "Bench to Bar," Campbell
Law Observer (October 30, 1981), p. 12. For a more complete discussion of adminis
trative law the reader is referred to: Bernard Schwartz, Administrative Law (Boston;
Little, Brown and Company, 1976). For a general discussion of the comparison be
tween academic debate and legal debate see; Patrick O. Marsh, "Is Debate Merely a
Game for Conservative Players?" Speaker and Cave/. I (January, 1964), 46-53.
SPEAKER AND GAVEL, Vol. 20 (1982-83), 13-20.
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court of law, and it is toward a consideration of these major differences that
this essay is addressed. To better reveal these differences the following
model can be postulated:
THE COURT OF REASON THE COURT OF LAW















While the labels for the components of each model are almost identical,
the functions of the components are often quite disparate. In order to more
easily understand these differences each component of the model will be
examined separately beginning with the first, and perhaps most important,
aspect of the process: evidence.
The intrinsic relationship of evidence to argumentation is axiomatic. It is
indicated in that long standing dictum "he who asserts must prove" as well
as in the literature.^ It is a virtual given that evidence and the theories which
govern the evaluation of evidence are some of the most important aspects
of argumentation and debate.* For example, in that area of the court of
reason known as academic debate, the participants are urged to gather
evidence, to evaluate it, to organize it, to employ it, and, during the course
of a debate, to argue about it. Normally, in an academic debate the partic
ipants present the evidence directly to the receivers (the judge(s)), the par
ticipants argue about the evidence through evidential attacks, and ultimate-
^ For example, see: Donald P. Cushman, T. J. Larkin, and Dennis Lefebvre, "Evi
dence, Argument, and Form" in Advanced Debate Readings in Theory, Practice and
Teaching Ed. David A. Thomas (Skokie, III.: National Textbook Company, 1979), pp.
215-219. Austin J. Freely, Argumentation and Debate (Belmont, Calif.: Wadsworth Pub
lishing Company, 1981), pp. 74-109. Maridell Fryar and David A. Thomas, Basic Debate
(Skokie, III.: National Textbook Company, 1981), pp. 22-34,197,200. J. Vernon Jensen,
Argumentation Reasoning in Communication (New York; D. Van Nostrand Company,
1981), pp. 107-138. Gerald H. Sanders, "Toward More Effective Use of Evidence in
Academic Debate" in Advanced Debate Readings in Theory, Practice and Teaching Ed.
David A. Thomas (Skokie, III.: National Textbook Company, 1979), pp. 227-238. James
Edward Sayer, Argumentation and Debate Principles and Applications (Sherman Oaks,
Calif.: Alfred Publishing Company, 1980), pp. 95-96, 155-187. ). Michael Sproule,
Argument Language and Its Influence (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1980),
pp. 30, 102-141, 387.
* Ibid.
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ly the judge(s) render a decision (hopefully in accordance with the evidential
inputs). The procedure is different in the court of law. In both the courts
of reason and law, evidential inputs normally begin the decision making
process. However, the types of evidence employed vary: the court of reason
relies, in the main, on authoritative testimony, the court of law—direct
evidence.
In the court of reason, we normally know what we know through au
thoritative testimony. When our automobile does not run well we take it
to a mechanic. When the mechanic, after examination, says: "It looks to me
like a blown head gasket and if it is, it'll cost you around $175.00 or so for
me to fix it," few of us have the necessary expertise to verify or challenge
his conclusion. Instead, most of us pretend that we understand him and
that we know what he is talking about. As lay persons, we have essentially
two choices: believe him and let him fix the car or disbelieve him and try
to take the car elsewhere. Few of us have the time, money, or inclination
to become mechanics in order to repair the vehicle ourselves. Similarly,
when we are sick we consult a physician. We can either believe what our
doctor tells us or see another doctor. Few of us are going to attend medical
school in order to acquire the expertise needed to verify or challenge our
physician's conclusions. Very few intercollegiate debaters know the throw
weight of an MX, Minuteman, or Titan missile through first hand experience
or direct evidence. Yet, during the 1980-81 academic year many, if not
most, intercollegiate debaters were well aware of that data.® They knew
what they knew because someone told them—not because they crawled
through missile silos counting and weighing warheads, calculating thrust
capacity, and figuring throw weight. In short, they knew what they knew
because of "authoritative" testimony. This is the way of the court of reason.
We know most of what we know, not through first hand experience or
direct evidence, but because someone has told us.
In contrast, the court of law relies heavily, if not primarily, on direct
evidence.^ To wit: the prosecutor brings in a gun and a body. The prose
cutor supplies evidence, registrations and the like, to prove that this is
Ralph's gun. The prosecutor supplies evidence which establishes that Ralph's
fingerprints, and only Ralph's fingerprints, are on the gun. The prosecutor
supplies evidence which proves that Ralph's gun was the weapon used to
kill Sam. The prosecutor supplies evidence which proves that the body is
(a) dead and (b) Sam's. At this juncture, the state is well along the way toward
establishing a prima fade case that Ralph killed Sam. The lynch pins in this
case are direct evidence.
Not only is direct evidence emphasized in the court of law, but much of
the "authoritative" testimony used in the court of reason would not be
admitted into the court of law. It would be rendered inadmissible—exclud
ed as hearsay. Depending on the facts of the case, for instance, you cannot
' The National Debate Resolution for that year was, "Resolved: That the United
States should significantly increase its foreign policy commitments.
* American /ur/sprudence Second Edition (Rochester, N.V. The Lawyers Co-operative
Publishing Company and San Francisco: Bancroft-Whitney Company, 1967), Volume
29, pp. 37-38.
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teli the court that your automobile has a blown head gasket (objection-
conclusion), or that your mechanic told you that your car's engine has a
blown head gasket (objection—hearsay). Under the proper circumstances,
the mechanic could be brought into court, sworn in, and asked if he told
you that the engine has a blown head gasket. However, depending once
again on the fact situation, his statement would not necessarily be allowed
to evidence the point that the car's engine has a blown head gasket—only
that he told you that it did. Evidential inputs, then, in the court of law are
very different from those in the court of reason.
Compounding these differences are the channels through which the evi
dence is directed toward its receivers. In the court of reason, the evidence
may be presented directly to the receivers or it may be mediated. Thus the
channels are either unmediated (direct) or mediated. Much of the evidence
we receive in the court of reason is mediated. We read the throw weight
of an MX missile in Time magazine. We hear that Ralph was convicted of
the slaying of Sam on the radio. We watch the local news on television and
learn more concerning this conviction. However, much of the evidence we
receive in the court of reason is, at least largely, unmediated. Our com
munications with our lawyers, doctors, and automobile mechanics as well
as with our butchers, teachers, bankers, pharmacists, and others of a similar
nature are reasonably direct. Thus, the evidence which we receive from
them in form of "authoritative" testimony is unmediated. Not so in the
court of law. Here all of the evidence is mediated—mediated by the court
and through the court under the auspices of the court, i.e., the judge(s).'
No evidence is admissible into the court of law unless and until the judge(s)
allow it to be admitted, judge(s) can and do exclude evidence for a variety
of reasons.® Whereas in the court of reason the receivers are reasonably
open to virtually all forms of evidential input, indeed the receivers are free
to seek out evidence on their own, in the court of law the receivers are
dependent upon the judge(s) for the evidence which they will receive.
Furthermore, not only can judge(s) exclude evidence, they can, by such
procedures as the taking of judicial notice,' include evidence and/or give
greater probity to evidence which they may chose to admit. The judge(s) in
the court of law then function as gate keepers, systematically admitting and
excluding evidence from the consideration of the receivers.
Channel differences account for the major epistemological disparities in
evidential theory in the courts of reason and law. In the court of reason,
receivers are exposed to vast inputs of information. As consumers of rhet-
' For example, see: Michael W. Patrick, "Toward a Codification of the Law of Evi
dence in North Carolina," Wake forest Law Review 16 (October, 1980), 669-709.
® For example, see: 1981 Edition Federal Rules Criminal Procedure Evidence Appe//afe
Procedure (St. Paul, Minn.; West Publishing Company, 1981), p. 169. (Hereinafter re
ferred to as Federal Rules). It states in part: "Although relevant, evidence may be
excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of
undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence." It is
up to the judge(s) to do the excluding and to make the value judgments pertaining
thereunto.
' For example, see; Federal Rules, pp. 161-162. Melinda Beck, "Footnote to the
Holocaust," Newsweek (October 19, 1981), 73.
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oric, they are frequently bombarded by evidence. The major factors which
limit their evidential inputs can be viewed as being psychological in nature,
for example, selective attention, selective perception, selective retention,
and selective evaluation. Thus, in the court of reason, almost all evidence is
admissible, therefore, the receiver must be capable of evaluating it. Unlike
receivers in the court of law, receivers in the court of reason do not have
the judge(s) to guide them. In the court of law, the judge(s) govern the
admission of evidence, in the court of reason, it is the receivers who do so.
Thus, evidential theory in the court of law involves, in the main, issues of
admissibility,^® whereas evidential theory in the court of reason calls on the
receivers to evaluate the evidence themselves and is not therefore funda
mentally concerned with admissibility (as basically all evidence can, theo
retically at least, be admitted into the court of reason) but rather with the
ability and willingness of the evidence to tell the truth," thereby mooting
the issue of admissibility.
Receivers in the courts of reason and law serve essentially similar func
tions. Their role is to process and evaluate the evidence with a view toward
decision making judgments."  Receivers in both arenas are thus engaged
in what could be loosely termed hypothesis formulation, testing, adoption,
or rejection." The differences are in how the receivers came to be in the
^®The catalogs of law schools are especially revealing regarding this point. For
example, in describing the course in legal evidence, the Bulletin of the Wake Forest
University School of Law 1981-1982 states: "The rules and standards by which the
admission of proof at trial is regulated" (p. 35). Similarly, the University of San Diego
School of Law 1981-1983 8u//etin reads: "This course is concerned with the rules
which limit the facts, opinions, and things that may be used in proof, and also, with
the rules which govern how they may be evidenced" (p. 40). The University of Notre
Dame Law School Bulletin of Information 1982-1983 states that the evidence course:
"Studies the legal principles governing the admissibility of controversial facts in ju
dicial proceedings ..." (p. 18). The 7987-52 Catalog of Vermont Law School informs
the reader that: "The course will consider the rules governing the admissibility of
testimonial, physical, documentary, and demonstrative evidence in trials and other
formal legal proceedings" (p. 29). The Western New England Co//ege School of Law
Bulletin 1982-1983 describes the legal evidence course as: "An introduction to the
basic rules of the exclusionary system of evidence which govern the proof of disputed
propositions of fact in criminal and civil trials" (p. 60).
" For a case study which applies the historigraphical criteria of the ability and will
ingness of a witness to tell the truth to some of the major sources of evidence used
in the court of reason see; Robert P. Newman, "The Weekly Fiction Magazines," The
Central States Speech journal XVII (May, 1966), 118-124.
"For example, see: Tim Lee, Dave Harris, and Craig Dudczak, "Empirical Studies
and Their Use in Debate" in Advanced Debate Readings in Theory Practice and Teaching
Ed. David A. Thomas (Skokie, III.: National Textbook Company, 1979) pp. 251-271.
Allan j. Lichtman, Daniel M. Roher, and Joseph Mizner, "The Role of Empirical Evi
dence in Debate: A Systems Approach" in Advanced Debate Readings in Theory Prac
tice and Teaching Ed. David A. Thomas (Skokie, III.: National Textbook Company, 1979)
pp. 272-286. Robert P. Newman and Dale R. Newman, Evidence (New York: Houghton
Mifflin and Company, 1969).
" For example, see: Patrick, 669-709. American Jurisprudence Second Edition (Roch
ester, N.Y.: The lawyers Co-operative Publishing Company and San Francisco: Ban
croft-Whitney Company, 1967), Volume 29. Federal Rules pp. 155-238.
" For an analysis of the process of hypothesis treatment as it applies to academic
debate specifically see: Lee, Harris, and Dudczak, pp. 251-271.
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courts and the degree of rigor involved in the evidential evaluation and
decision making present in each court.
Receivers come into the court of reason on a self-selecting or ad hoc
basis. Some, such as the intercollegiate debater, are there because they
decide to be. Some, such as the professional policy analyst/decision maker,
know where they are and what is expected of them. Others, such as Sam
and Samantha Spacecadet, may only occasionally enter the court of reason
and, upon arrival, have little knowledge of where they are or what their
role is.
In contrast, receivers enter the court of law because they are summoned.
Few individuals like to wile away the hours watching courtroom proceed
ings. Indeed, many of those called for jury duty try to get excused—some
successfully. Those who remain, however, are there because they were called,
not because they volunteered. Whereas almost anyone can enter and par
ticipate in the court of reason, only those called and selected can enter and
participate in the court of law. The selection process excuses many of the
jurors who are called. Officers of the court will dismiss, either for cause or
preemption, jurors whom they think will render an unfavorable judgment.
Thus, unlike the receivers in the court of reason who are self-selected or
are selected on an ad hoc basis, the receivers in the court of law are ex
amined, evaluated, and theoretically, at least, carefully selected.'®
just as the selection process which determines the receivers of each court
varies, so to does the mental rigor with which each group of receivers is
expected to perform.
In the court of reason, performance expectations vary as to the situations
and circumstances. Normally, for example, more ability should be expected
of a varsity debater on the first circuit than a novice debater on the third.
Greater mental wherewithal regarding the on-going Middle East crisis should
be expected from a policy analyst/decision maker employed by the Rand
Corporation than from an instructor in political science 101 at somewhere
community college. More sophisticated consumer decision making should
be expected of the researcher employed by Consumer's Union than by
Harry and Harriet Homemaker. Not withstanding this variance, however,
receivers in the court of reason are all engaged in essentially the same task:
evidential evaluations involving hypothesis formulation, testing, adoption,
or rejection, i.e., decision making. The differences among receivers in the
court of reason lie not in their tasks but in the ability and willingness with
which they perform their tasks.
In the court of law, performance expectations of receivers are high and,
unlike the court of reason, continued on-going efforts are made in order
that these high standards of expectations can be met. The receivers are
" One particular aspect of the court of reason merits the special attention of a
footnote—the judge(s) at debate tournaments. Tournament practices vary, at some
the judgefs) are assigned on a random basis, at others the judgefs) are carefully screened.
In some instances judging selection falls into the middle of the above continuum.
For additional information see: Peggy H. Gibson and L. Dean Fadely, "Debate Judging:
A Perspective," Debate Issues 11 (December, 1976), 5-7. John T. Morello, "Intercol
legiate Debate: Proposals for a Struggling Activity," Speaker and Cave/ 17 (Winter,
1980), 103-107.
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carefully selected, a situation which is not always possible in the court of
reason. Throughout the trial, the receivers are instructed by the judge,
thereby supplying them with a known reference frame into which the evi
dence they are receiving can be fitted. Before the jury retires to deliberate,
they receive additional instructions from the judge designed to focus the
evidence and clarify the issues which have been presented. During their
deliberations, the jury can ask the judge for further instructions or clarifi
cations. Only after, and in light of, all of the above procedures does the
jury make its judgment and render its verdict. Furthermore, there are in
stances where the court of law holds that the matters under consideration
are too weighty, too complicated, too complex, even for jurors assembled
under the best of the foregoing circumstances. In such situations, the court
of law can choose to utilize a bench trial—a situation which might best be
described to the layperson as a sort of jury of judge(s).
The final difference to be considered lies in the nature of the judgment
which the receivers of the courts of reason and law render. Typically, it is
the role of receivers in the court of reason to evaluate the evidence and
make a deliberative judgment. They must decide on the efficacy of a future
course of action; they render a policy decision. In contrast, receivers in the
court of law may be called upon to make either a deliberative or forensic
judgment. In the latter, of course, the jurors decide the guilt or innocence
of the accused, i.e., whether or not the defendant(s) committed a particular
act or particular acts in the past. In the former, the court is frequently
engaging in appellate advocacy and their decisions have the effect of pro
ducing policy;'® relatively recent examples include: Brown v. Board of Edu
cation,^^ Mapp V. Ohio,'® Baker v. Carr," Gideon v. Wainwright,^" Escobedo v.
Illinois, Katzenbach v. McClung," Griswold v. Connect/cut," Miranda v. Ari
zona," New York Times Co. v. Roe v. Wade,^® Doe v. Bo/ton,^' and U.S.
V. Nixon." The policy decisions thus produced can have effects equal to, or
greater than, the policy decisions promulgated by the court of reason."
'® For an analysis of a criminal trial in which the jurors were called upon to render
both deliberative and forensic judgments, see: Vivian I. Dicks, "Courtroom Rhetorical
Strategies: Forensic and Deliberative Perspectives," The Quarterly Journal of Speech
67 (May, 1981), 178-192. The article examines the Angela Davis trial in which Ms.
Davis was charged with kidnapping, murder, and conspiracy.
'■ 347 U.S. 493 (1954) and 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
'• 367 U.S. 643(1961).
"369 U.S. 186(1962).
"372 U.S. 335 (1963).
" 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
" 379 U.S. 294(1964).
" 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
" 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
"403 U.S. 713 (1971) (per cur/am).
"410 U.S. 113 (1973).
"410 U.S. 179(1973).
"418 U.S. 683,692 (1974).
"For a readable, if popularized, analysis of the policy role in appellate litigation
see: Bob Woodward and Scott Armstrong, The Brethren (New York; Avon Books,
1979). For a more scholarly treatment, see: Richard Neely, How Courts Govern America
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1981). Harold j. Spaeth, "Computer 9, Supreme
Court 0," Barrister 9 (Spring, 1982), 8-11, 37.
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This essay has sought to identify some of the major differences in the
processes which occur within the courts of reason and law with a view
toward explaining these differences. While this essay has not sought to ar
gue the overall superiority of one arena over the other, I would agree with
the observations of sociologist and philosopher C. Wright Mills:
... when there are values so firmly and consistently held by genuinely con
flicting interests that the conflict can not be resolved by logical analysis and
factual investigation, then the role of reason in that human affair seems at
an end In the end, if the end comes, we just have to beat those who
disagree with us over the head; let us hope that the end comes seldom. In
the meantime, being as reasonable as we are able to be, we ought all to
argue."
When arguing ceases and beating begins, the court of reason gives way
to the court of law, a court which, in our litigious society, frequently be
comes the ultimate arbiter. Those who wish to successfully make the trans
fer from the court of reason to the court of law, especially those with a
background in the field of intercollegiate debate competition, need to rec
ognize the fundamental differences between the processes which occur in
both arenas.
" C. Wright Mills, The Sociological Imaginallon (New York: Oxford University Press,
1959), p. 77.
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DEBATE AMONG THE CROPPERS
Keith H. Griffin
The Southern Tenant Farmers' Union was perhaps the first group ever to
unite blacks and whites to fight for their common interests. By 1937, the
STFU boasted of over 30,000 members in 328 locals across seven states. This
figure may be deceptively low because many croppers "could not afford to
pay the due of ten cents a month.
Unlike cash tenants who essentially remain independent of the landlord,
renting only the land for a fixed payment, and share tenants who provide
their own seed and equipment for two-third's to three-fourth's the cash
value of the crop, sharecroppers supply only their labor and receive one-
half the crop. The landlord keeps all the records and handles all sales. The
cropper only makes what is left of his share of the profits after deductions
for all items advanced by the landlord. During the Depression, croppers
were forced to live in squalid conditions. Delapidated shacks, unsanitary
water supplies, improper diet, poor clothing, sporadic medical care and
educational opportunities, and "can to can't" working hours combined to
create living conditions which "would make an eskimo rejoice he did not
live in cotton growing country.
The STFU championed a program which today appears mild. They sought
access to woodlands to secure fuel, land for gardens, free schools with
books and hot lunches, decent contracts, higher wages, better hours, the
right to sell their cotton at market prices to whomever they chose, and an
end to evictions. While some small landowners acceded to the demands,
the STFU accomplished little. The Union was eventually overwhelmed by a
combination of obstacles: croppers found it difficult to attend meetings,
landowner-backed violence, the indifference of the Roosevelt administra
tion, a weak financial base, and, ultimately, the mechanization of cotton
farming. The fact that poor uneducated people overcame a century-old
legacy of racism to challenge the planters represents a unique triumph in
public debate. The purpose of this monograph is to examine the rhetorical
strategies of identification utilized by STFU organizers to unite black and
white croppers.
A Rhetoric of Identification
The STFU was the brainchild of H. L Mitchell and Clay East of Tyronza,
Arkansas. Mitchell, a former tenant farmer, and East sought a way by which
the croppers could protect themselves. As Mitchell recalls, "We had no
intention of establishing an interracial union. None of us had ever belonged
Keith H. Griffin is Associate Professor of Speech Communication at Win-
gate College.
' Arkansas Gazette (Little Rock), April 15,1982.
' Charles Johnson, Edwin R. Embree, and W. W. Alexander, The Collapse of Cotton
Tenancy (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1935), p. 15.
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to a union, and we didn't know anything about it. All we wanted to do
was ... help the sharecroppers."' Mitchell and East soon realized an inte
grated union was essential and that the odds against this occurring were
formidable.
Howard Kester notes that after the Civil War "sharecropping as a system
of producing cotton (was) as fundamental to the southern economy as banks
and currency. Following the Civil War, the southern aristocracy turned to
sharecropping as a means for continuing its existence.'" Considerable effort
was exerted to keep the former slaves in their place—the fields. W. J. Cash
wrote of the "vastly ego-warming and ego-expanding distinction, even the
most common white man, by nature of his race, enjoyed in comparison
with Negro."' However, the post-bellum economy and subsequent depres
sions of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century forced many white
families from land ownership into farm tenancy. The long-standing antag
onism of whites and blacks was intensified by their competition for jobs.
When whites laid off from the factories returned to the country, landowners
tended to replace Negro tenants with them. By 1935, nearly two-thirds of
all farm tenants were white, and in North Carolina "between 8,000 and
12,000 families... had been displaced and had no crops at all."®
The initial success of the STFU was due primarily to the commitment of
influential men who, motivated by a sense of justice, initiated their work in
an arena where white and black croppers knew each other well. On the
night of July 11, 1934, twenty-seven croppers, almost evenly divided amorig
whites and blacks, gathered at the Sunnyside School on the Norcross plan
tation near Tyronza. Some of the whites were former Klan members. Some
of the blacks were former members of a Negro union wiped out at the
Elaine, Arkansas massacre in 1919. An old Negro, a survivor of that massacre,
addressed the question of whether one union could serve the interests of
both white and black croppers:
We colored people can't organize without you, and you white folks can't
organize without us. Aren't we all brothers and ain't God the Father of us
all? We live under the same sun, eat the same food, wear the same kind of
clothing, work on the same land, raise the same crop for the same landlord
who oppresses and cheats us both. For a long time now the white folks and
the colored folks have been fighting each other and both of us has been
getting whipped all the time. We don't have nothing against one another,
but we got plenty against the landlord. The same chain that holds my people
holds your people too. If we're chained together on the outside, we ought
to stay chained together in the union. It won't do no good for us to divide
because there's where the trouble has been all the time. The landlord is
always betwixt us, beatin' us and starvin' us and making us fight each other.
There ain't but one way, that's for us to get together and stay together.'
Those present chose to lay aside their racial animosities and work together.
Alvin Nunnally, a white cropper, was elected chairman, C. H. Smith, a black
' The Commercial Appeal (Memphis), March 3, 1982.
* Howard Kester, Revolt Among the Sharecroppers (New York: Arno Press, 1969),
. 18.
' W. J. Cash, The Mind of the South (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1941), pp. 38-39.
® Johnson ef a/.. The Collapse of Cotton Tenancy, p. 63.
' Kester, Revolt Among the Sharecroppers, p. 56.
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preacher, was elected vice-chairman, and another black preacher was elect
ed chaplin.
Building upon this initial "common-ground" appeal, STFU organizers sub
sequently developed and employed four additional identification strategies.
Religion
The only institution with which sharecroppers were familiar was the
country church. Hence, STFU enlisted the aid of the clergy and meetings
were patterned after church services. Members sang "We Shall Not Be
Moved" and recited the Lord's Prayer before Union business was discussed.
Identification of the planter with Pharoah was traditional with southern black
men; Scripture could be used to support organizing speeches as well as
sermons; and churches were commonly the only buildings available for
meetings of any kind. Even Norman Thomas, when he came to the Delta,
fell into the shout-and-respond pattern of rural southern preaching: 'The
only approach is for the workers to organize (ORGANIZE the congregation
repeats without breaking the rhythm) and stick together (STICK TOGETHER/
YES SIR/ HALLELUJAH). Stick together the white man and the black man
(PRAISE GOD) and seek justice in our union (UNION/ YOU'RE RIGHT,
BROTHER THOMAS/ AMEN).'«
Through the appealing values of fundamentalist religion and the familiar
conventions of the church meeting, the STFU found an effective vehicle to
reach the tenant farmers.
Music and Poetry
Enthusiastic singing helped strengthen identification with the Union. Fa
vorite hymns like "Give Me That Old Time Religion" became "It's a Won
derful Union," and "Jesus Is My Captain," a camp meeting favorite, became
the folk classic "We Shall Not Be Moved."
The Union is a Marching
We shall not be moved.
The Union is a Marching
We shall not be moved.
Just like a tree that's planted by the water.
We shall not be moved.
John Handcox, the black sharecropper troubadour, wrote "We're Gonna
Roll the Union On" and "Raggedy, Raggedy Are We";
The poor man raise all the rich man can eat
And then gets tramped down under the rich man's feet.
Raggedy, raggedy are we
lust as raggedy as raggedy can be.
We don't get nothin' from our labor
So raggedy, raggedy are we.*
The STFU also dramatized the conflict between the croppers and the
* Donald Grubbs, Cry from Cotton: The STfU and the New Deal (Chapel Hill: Uni
versity of North Carolina Press, 1971), p. 65.
» The Commerdai Appeal (Memphis), April 17, 1982.
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landlord in poetry. In "The Death of the Union Man," Sterling Brown tells
of an unidentified tenant farmer who, beaten by his landlord, the sheriff
"and some well-armed riffraff," refuses to divulge information about the
local Union. With his dying words, he gives up one secret;
We gonna clean out this brushwood round here soon,
Plant the White Oak and the Black Oak side by side."
The Two-Local System
In creating a movement where race was unimportant, the STFU devel
oped the two-local system. In communities too large for whites and blacks
to know each other well, STFU leaders decided to organize segregated
locals. "As membership increased in these locals and the tenants realized
they were engaged in the same fight, it became increasingly difficult for
members of one race to refuse invitations to attend the other's meetings.""
White Commitment
White organizers who literally risked their lives for the STFU became
powerful symbols with which both races could identify. William Thomas
Brown, son of a cropper and a student at Shaw University in Raleigh, started
the first and only STFU local in North Carolina. Brown learned of the Union
when Howard Kester, a Methodist minister and social activist, spoke at Shaw.
Brown recalls that
the secretary of the YMCA at North Carolina State University ... always
shared his speakers with Shaw ... and I heard Howard Kester speak and
that's when Howard told about the Union and what it was going through
out in Memphis and how he spoke one afternoon ... and how he had to
get out the window because the landlords were after him .... Let me say
one thing about a white man like Howard. See, he's called a nigger-lover,
and he's worse off, they'll treat him worse than a black man. He was out
there organizing these blacks and whites, he was integrating in those days.
Man, that was a crime!... And so he was speaking in a church somewhere,
and these landlords broke into the church and beat him up ... when I heard
Howard say this .... I got angry ... and I said I'm going to do something
about this...."
Local #200 had a short life, but Brown suggests that had a white organizer
like Mitchell or Kester become involved, the white tenants "probably would
have listened to them."" H. L. Mitchell also is confident that had white and
black organizers worked together in North Carolina—"It was 800 or more
miles from Memphis to Raleigh and the STFU had no money to pay travel
expenses for such distances" in those days"—the Union could have met
better success.
" Letter, H. L. Mitchell to author, August 28, 1982.
Grubbs, Cry From Cotton, p. 67.
" Interview, William Thomas Brown, August 24,1982, Greensboro, North Carolina.
" Interview, William Thomas Brown.
" Letter, H. L. Mitchell to author, August 28, 1982.
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Conclusion
The achievement of the STFU was "to focus attention on the plight of
the sharecropper."" As Mitchell says, "We met violent opposition every
where. We had access to newspapers, and radio, and made use of these and
the few liberal people in Memphis and Little Rock."" The STFU's reliance
on agitational rhetoric was typical of a protest and reform movement. Rem
iniscent of populist Mary "Yellin" Lease of Kansas, The Sharecropper's Voice
instructed Union members to "Raise plenty of Hell, and you will get some
where.""
The reality of an integrated union threw the planters into a frenzy of
anger and fear. They responded with traditional appeals to white supremacy
and a plethora of terrorist tactics. Armed hoodlums menaced STFU meet
ings, members were beaten, their families were threatened, evictions in
creased, and some men were killed. It is likely that a repeat of Elaine mas
sacre was averted only because of the presence of white men in most locals.
Unlike any prior institutions in the South, the STFU joined poor whites
and blacks together through a common goal. The Union's success was due
in large part to the ability of its spokesmen in developing a rhetoric of
identification capable of winning the internal debate over the formation of
an interracial organization. The significance of this debate was that the
Southern Tenant Farmers Union existed at all.
"George B. Tindall, The Emergence of (he New South, 1913-1945 (Baton Rouge:
Louisiana State University Press, 1967), p. 421.
" Letter, H. L. Mitchell to author, August 28, 1982.
" Sharecropper's Voice, November 1,1936, STFU Manuscript Collection, North Car
olina State University.
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DSR-TKA AS AN HONOR SOCIETY
James McBath
Honor societies have had a place in American higher education ever since
Phi Beta Kappa was organized as a literary and debating society in 1776. This
first undergraduate society was open to all qualified students since there
were no fields of specialization. All colleges then in existence were for the
purpose of training men for "the service of the church and state." A half
century later, with the expansion of education into new fields, Phi Beta
Kappa elected to remain with the liberal arts and sciences. Disciplinary or
specialized honor societies then were formed as were learned societies in
the parent disciplines. The 18B0's saw establishment of Tau Beta Phi in en
gineering and Sigma Xi in scientific research. Most of our present honor
societies were formed in the early years of the 20th century. Delta Sigma
Rho {founded in 1906) and Tau Kappa Alpha (organized in 1908) were part
of this new movement in higher education.
DSR-TKA is a long-time member of the Association of College Honor
Societies. TKA was admitted in 1937; DSR became a member in 1955. ACHS
is a coordinating and consulting agency for national and international honor
societies. The association cooperatively develops standards and definitions,
considers substantive and administrative practices, and distributes infor
mation interpreting the honor society movement. Formed in 1925 by lead
ers of six long-established honor socieities, ACHS facilitates the common
interests of honor societies in colleges and universities. Its growth at first
was slow; only six additional societies were admitted during the 20 years
following its founding. Some of these were approved only after extended
debate. The period of greatest growth in ACHS came during the late 1940's
and 1950's when prominent societies in specialized academic areas were
encouraged to apply for admission. Membership in ACHS always has been
as selective as is membership in an honor society itself. Only a half dozen
societies have been admitted in the last decade. The organization now in
cludes about 50 honor societies in its membership. Some groups, like Mor
tar Board and Phi Kappa Phi, represent all academic fields, while others, like
Psi Chi (psychology). Kappa Tau Alpha (journalism), and Phi Sigma Alpha
(political science) represent specific fields. All of them share a requirement
that scholarship and academic achievement are prime conditions of mem
bership. In this standard, the honor societies differ from the scores of rec
ognition societies that do not have a requirement of academic accomplish
ment.
Membership in ACHS has several conspicuous benefits for student mem
bers and to DSR-TKA itself. First, affiliation with ACHS links forensics with
the academic component of university life. It underscores the intellectual
dimensions of forensics. Administrators and educational decision makers are
familiar with the "honor society" concept and regard honor society status
James McBath is Professor of Communication Arts and Sciences at the
University of Southern California.
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as a stamp of substantive quality. Nearly all academic administrators belong
to general or disciplinary honor societies; some of them are national honor
society officers.
Second, honor society affiliation is professionally advantageous because it
certifies the goals and character of one's educational activity. Dossiers, vitae,
biographical directories, employment documents, all record honor society
membership. Employment interview forms for major corporations typically
request this information. Since 1963 the U.S. Civil Service Commission has
permitted honor society members to enter Federal service at the CS-7 level
(instead of GS-5) with a correspondingly higher salary. Honor society mem
bership is viewed widely as a validation of educational achievement.
It was noted earlier that ACHS also serves a consultative function. At the
1982 meeting in New Orleans, Maurice Moore of Alpha Epsilon Delta (pre-
medicine) summarized the advice his society had gained from ACHS: mem
bership records, insignia, convention planning, publications, member ser
vices, ideas for financial support, organization development, and the like.
Honor societies share common problems and have developed a variety of
strategies for coping with them. My report of March 15, 1982, to the DSR-
TKA National Council reviewed a number of suggestions that emerged dur
ing the New Orleans meeting:
1. Societies should review their dues structures periodically. Dues of all
ACHS members range from $5.00 to $30.50. About 75% of the societies
have dues that are $15.00 or above. The most frequently reported induction
fee was $20.00.
2. Societies should compare products and services of the jewelry man
ufacturers. Balfour was at the meeting as well as J. O. Pollack and Company
and Burr, Patterson, and Auld Company. These three firms compete na
tionally for the business of ACHS members.
3. Some of the older societies augment their income through bequests
and charitable gifts from alumni. Tau Beta Pi, for example, distributes a small
brochure that describes tax-deductible gift opportunities.
4. Several societies use an award for chapter-of-the-year and/or sponsor-
of-the-year to motivate chapters. Part of the reward is notification by the
society national president to the institution's president.
5. A number of societies make a practice of announcing election of of
ficers and annual conferences in the Chronicle of Higher Education. CHE will
print this information in its "Gazette" section.
6. Some societies encourage local chapters to send letters of congratu
lation to the parents and high school principals of initiates.
7. Societies are looking for ways to recognize sponsors. Some of them
schedule a social event for chapter sponsors at the convention of their
national professional association. One society distributes a pocket appoint
ment book embossed with the sponsor's name.
8. A number of societies have developed guidelines or criteria for "chap
ters in good standing." They feel that the set of affirmative standards is more
effective than a set of negatively stated requirements.
9. Some societies follow the practice of sending a letter to the institu
tion's president expressing appreciation for the honor society on the cam
pus. They also thought their most effective "last resort" action on problem
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chapters was a letter to the dean or academic vice-president with a copy
to the sponsor.
10. Other societies periodically send a letter to the president of member
institutions, with card enclosed, requesting confirmation of the name of the
official sponsor on campus.
11. ACHS societies should be sure that their names appear in the printed
commencement program and in bulletins of the institution.
The great national honor societies take vigorous interest in their ACHS
affiliation and exploit its prestige on their campuses. They believe that uni
versity administrators know about (and belong to) honor societies and that
to them ACHS membership symbolizes academic quality. Affiliation with
ACHS does not guarantee endorsement by the academic community, but
it does identify DSR-TKA with a distinguished scholarly company. It makes
a clear statement about the purposes and standards of our society.
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!n response to the reductionist concept of argumentative validity offered
by contemporary western analytic philosophy, students of practical reason
ing have developed significantly enriched theories of argumentation. These
theories account for audience and take as given the view that argumentation
can only be fully understood as part of a complete rhetorical context. Along
these lines, one school of thought has come to view judicial reasoning as a
useful replacement for the a-rhetorical, tautological model provided by
mathematical logic. Stephen Toulmin and Chaim Perelman have highlighted
the resulting "new rhetoric" theory of practical reasoning which holds that
argumentation conforms to the judicial model of argument.'
Toulmin and Perelman have gone a long way toward showing how judicial
reasoning informs argumentation theory. For example, Perelman has expli
cated the general nature of juridical proof to show that legal interpretation
is based on argumentation that must convince the judge and not on an
impersonal and conclusive demonstration.^ Perelman has described the
general nature of justification in legal settings' and highlighted the impor
tant relationship between legal ontologies and legal reasoning.* Yet perhaps
the most practical expression of Perelman's study appears in the treatise he
co-authored with Olbrechts-Tyteca. Here the authors provide detailed dis
cussions of discursive techniques available to the rhetorical practitioner.*
Unlike Perelman, Toulmin is not a trained legal advocate. Nonetheless,
his study of legal reasoning has led him to develop a theory of argumenta
tion which conforms to many of the general principles of judicial reasoning.
Ms. J. M. Makau is Assistant Professor of Communication at The Ohio
State University.
' In his seminal treatise on argumentation, Uses of Argument, for example, Stephen
Toulmin urges that we "take as our model the discipline of jurisprudence." {Cam
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 1958), p. 7. Similarly, Chaim Perelman frequently
refers to the special nature of judicial reasoning. These frequent references led E.
Griffin-Collart to observe in the preface to a volume dedicated to Perelman's work
that Perelman holds judicial reasoning as the best model for argumentation theory.
See, the Preface to the Revue Internationale de Phiiosophie, La NouveWe Rhetoriquer
fssais en Hommage a Cha/m Perelman, p. 127-128 (1979), p. 3.
' Chaim Perelman, "The Specific Nature of Juridical Proof," Journal des Tribunaux,
Brussels, 1959, No. 4255.
' For example, in his public lecture at the University of California, Berkeley in 1979,
Perelman discussed the topic, "Justification of Norms in the Law." This topic is also
covered to some degree in his collection of essays. The New Mietoric and the Human
ities (Boston: D. Reidel and Co., 1979).
'Chaim Perelman, "Legal Ontology and Legal Reasoning," Israel Law Review 1981
(No. 3, 1981), 357-367.
' The New Rhetoric (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1969).
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On Toulmin's view, warrants replace major premises and argumentative
links are probable, rather than certain. Like Perelman, Toulmin emphasizes
the value of further detailed study of judicial reasoning as practiced. Indeed
Toulmin joins Perelman in encouraging others to continue in this difficult
task.^
This paper addresses one Important aspect of this task. Specifically, it
addresses the function judicial reasoning plays in the context of the highest
judicial tribunal in the United States.' This study illustrates how a functional
analysis of judicial reasoning may inform theories of argument. In particular,
this paper uses a functional analysis of judicial reasoning as practiced by
Supreme Court Justices in their judicial opinions to show the following:
I. Supreme Court argumentation is best understood as serving a set
of institutional functions not fully considered by the "new rhetor
ical" theory of practical reasoning developed by Perelman and Toul
min and;
II. The functional component of the "rhetoric-as-process" perspective
may be usefully added to the "new rhetorical" theory to better
accommodate the needs of Supreme Court critics;
III. Yet, other important components of the "rhetoric-as-process" per
spective limits this perspective's applicability in the Supreme Court
context.
The Functions of Judicial Opinions
The expression "functional analysis" will be used in this paper to refer to
evaluation in terms of a document's institutional purposes. A study of the
purposes played by judicial opinions reveals that in the context of the Su
preme Court, five levels of "function" generate the essence of the judicial
opinion's institutional purposes:
A. Justices function within an institutional context;
B. This context generates its own norms;
C. The composite audience derives legitimate expectations from these
norms;
D. judicial argumentation is directed toward fulfillment of these expec
tations and;
E. Justices seek thereby to reenforce the Court's image.®
* Many others have joined in encouraging such work. William Benoit notes, for
example, that "Our judicial system offers an important and unique laboratory for
studying the functions of argument in society. The fact that its influence is both
profound and pervasive provides ample justification for its significance as the object
of scholarly inquiry." William Lyon Benoit, "An Empirical Investigation of Argumen
tative Strategies Employed in Supreme Court Opinions," in D/mens/ons of Argument:
Proceedings of the Second Summer Conference on Argumentation. (Speech Commu
nication Association and Amerian Forensics Association, 1981), 179.
' Richard Rieke offers the following justification for focusing upon these judicial
opinions: "Since most law schools orient their instruction around examination of
cases, which means judicial opinions, this form of legal argument is influential on
other legal forums. Many would say that here is the essence of legal argument and it
is here that the search for a law field should be concentrated." Richard D. Rieke,
"Investigating Legal Argument as a Field," in Dimensions, p. 153.
' At first reading it may seem that this concept of "function" is synonymous with
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The most obvious institutional purpose served by the judicial opinion is
instructional in nature. First, judicial opinions provide vital administrative
instructions. Unless Justices clarify their decisions through coherent opin
ions, legal administrators will be unable to enforce the justices' decisions.
Second, only clearly written judicial opinions can serve as useful warrants
(in the form of precedents) for future rulings. Finally as Joseph Tussman
observes, people find "in the tribunal context significant clues to conduct."
Judicial opinions which detail the reasoning behind judicial decisions pro
vide essential information to the citizenry regarding likely consequences of
their behavior,'
A second well known purpose served by the judicial opinion is its pro
tective role in relation to arbitrary or capricious rulings. Just as the Court
serves as a bulwark against unreasonable executive and legislative behavior,
the criticism of judicial opinions and the rigorous demands imposed upon
the authors of judicial opinions provide important checks on judicial ca-
priciousness.^" This second function plays a major role in the generation of
norms and resulting expectations, as well as in the judicial effort to fulfill
these audience expectations."
Related to this second function of the judicial opinion is the need to
legitimize governmental behavior. The carefully written judicial opinion
serves to create the image that there are viable institutional checks against
capricious governmental behavior. Montesquieu argued accordingly that
"political liberty in relation to the subject ... consists in security, or in the
opinion people have of their security."^^
Toulmin's notion of "field." However, Toulmln's notion of a field is less focused on
the social-political-economic contextual considerations essential to the notion of
institutional function central to this paper. Furthermore, as this study of the functions
played by the judicial opinion illustrates, the notion of "function" used in this paper
encompasses both field-variant and field-invariant features.
' See Joseph Tussman, Obligation and the Body Politic (Oxford: University Press,
1974). Political theorist Montesquieu held, "The object of law in society is ... uni
formity of action, so that one member of society may know how, in certain circum
stances, another is likely to behave, this being the essence of security." Sp/rit of the
Laws, trans., Thomas Nugent (New York: Hafner Publishing Co., 1959), Bk. XII,
Sect. 4.
'® Herbert Wechsler noted in his seminal piece on constitutional adjudication, for
example, "ad hoc evaluation (of the Court's decisions] is, as it had always been, the
deepest problem of our constitutionalism." "Toward Neutral Principles of Constitu
tional Law." Harvard Law Review, 73:1 (November, 1959), 17.
" For a detailed discussion of judicial analysis of composite audience expectations
and judicial invention in light of these expectations, see James L. Golden and Josina
M. Makau, "Perspectives on Judicial Reasoning," in Explorations in Rhetoric, ed. by
Ray McKerrow (Glenview, Illinois: Scott, Foresman and Co., 1982), p. 157-177. See
also, Edmund Pincoffs, "The Audiences of the Judge," Logique et Analyse (Mars-juin,
1971), 337-344.
"My italics. Spirit of the Laws, p. 183. Roscoe Pound used a citation from Lord
Herscel's correspondence to Sir George Jessel to illustrate the historical basis of this
important aspect of the legal system, "As important as it was that people should get
justice, it was even more important that they should be made to feel and see that
they were getting it." Roscoe Pound, "Mechanical Jurisprudence." 8 Columbia Law
Review, 605 (1908), 606.
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The first three functions served by the judicial opinion are widely ac
cepted as constituting the foundation for the invention and evaluation of
judicial argumentation. However, the Court's history reveals yet another
function of the opinion; judicial opinions serve to maintain and improve
the Court's authoritative image. This final function has often been over
looked in analyses of judicial opinions, yet, as the following discussion will
demonstrate, the fourth function of the judicial opinion plays a significant
role in shaping judicial rhetorical invention."
We may best determine the role the image-generating function of the
judicial opinion plays in judicial rhetorical invention by enlisting the aid of
history. The brief historical discussion to follow provides a glimpse of the
complex rhetorical context in which Supreme Court opinions are written.
The Historic Roots of the judicial Opinion
Before accepting the Court as part of their constitutional government,
those who formed the government over two hundred years ago disputed
the need for and questioned the prudence of creating a potentially pow
erful judicial tribunal. To placate opponents of the original Supreme Court,
Alexander Hamilton wrote that because the Court would lack both purse
and sword to enforce its rulings, the Court would be .. beyond compar
ison the weakest department of power.""
The lack of noteworthiness characteristic of the Court's opening terms
seemed to reenforce Hamilton's position. This early lack of importance was
reflected, for example, by rejections of nominations to the Court. Indeed,
not only did respected individuals refuse to sit on the Court, several, in
cluding Chief Justice John Jay and Justice John Rutledge left the Court to
take more attractive positions in government. Furthermore, in 1801, Con
gress eliminated the Court's entire term.
The Court's reputation quickly changed, however, with the arrival of Chief
Justice John Marshall. Indisputably a skilled rhetorician, Justice Marshall wrote
eloquently of the Court's authority to overturn state and federal statutes on
constitutional grounds. Marshall's majority opinion in Marbury v. Madison,
1803, held that the Court had proper jurisdiction over any legislation which
the Court found "repugnant to the constitution." Marshall added that be
cause the constitution is the "fundamental and paramount law of the na
tion," "an act of the legislature, repugnant to the constitution, is void."
" Kenneth Salter observes in his study of pre-trial advocacy in jury trials that such
study requires an understanding of the "often complex cultural, social or religious
context in which the jury trial will be employed by both the government and its
antagonists to resolve important societal issues outside of the normal legislative and
political channels." Similarly, criticism of the judicial opinion requires a comprehen
sive understanding about the complex cultural, social, and political context in which
the judicial opinion will be employed by the Court's friends and antagonists. It is
imperative, therefore, to fully understand the nature and scope of the fourth function
served by the judicial opinion. Kenneth Salter, "The Functions of Legal Argumenta
tion in Pre-Trial Advocacy," in D/mens/ons, p. 268.
" Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay, The Federalist Papers (New
York; The New American library of World Literature, Inc., 1961), p. 465.
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Finally, "it is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department
to say what the law is."
This ruling, so eloquently set forth by Justice Marshall, significantly
strengthened the Court's power. Though in 1857 the North vilified the
Court following the Dred Scott decision, the Supreme Court's impact since
Marbury v. Madison has been considerable.
Yet even today the Court remains vulnerable to social and political cli
mates. Political scientist Philip Kurland notes, for example, that.
It was the weakened confidence in the Court that made possible the Fortas
affair. It was the popular mistrust of the Supreme Court that allowed im
peachment and removal of a Justice by methods other than those provided
by the Constitution The sword of Damocles hangs over the Court by
the thin thread, of public confidence in the integrity of the Judiciary.^'
Recent challenges of Judicial authority include ten years of unenforced
rulings in the area of racial desegregation. Despite a unanimous decision in
Brown v. Board of Education in 1954, for example, many lower courts failed
to enforce this ruling until 1964.^® More recently, Congress has seriously
considered legislation intended to restrict judicial power to adjudicate such
issues as abortion, school prayer, and school segregation. In this context,
such books as The Brethen, which necessarily "demystify" the Court's image,
further threaten the Court's ultimate authority." These serious challenges
to the Court's authority attest to the need to strengthen the basis of the
Court's power.
Institutionally, the Court's only source of political power is, as Hamilton
observed in The Federalist Papers, the Court's authoritative image. This need
to establish and maintain the Court's authoritative image thus greatly influ
ences judicial rhetorical invention. Through carefully tailored arguments
Supreme Court Justices demonstrate that their decisions are reasonable, fair,
and consistent with the Court's procedural rules. Indeed, of the four steps
characteristic of judicial reasoning, the final three—analysis of audience needs
and expectations; invention of relevant arguments; and justification of the
decision—focus on the degree to which judicial decision-making and con
sequent argumentation conform to the image appropriate to the Supreme
Court." The following look at the operation of rhetorical invention in a
decision regarding the constitutionality of a Connecticut statute banning
the sale of contraceptives" will illustrate the impressive role that the judicial
opinion's fourth function plays in judicial rhetorical invention.
" Philip Kurland, Politics, the Constitution and the Warren Court (Chicago: University
of Chicago Press, 1969), p. 23.
" For an interesting discussion of this phenomenon, see Waiter Murphy, "Lower
Court Checks on Supreme Court Power," In The Impact of Supreme Court Decisions,
ed. by Theodore L. Becker and Malcolm M. Feeley (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1969). See also, Stuart Nagel, "Court-Curbing Periods in American History," in Impact.
" Bob Woodward and Scott Armstrong, The Brethren (New York; Simon and Schus
ter, 1979).
" For a detailed discussion of the four steps characteristic of judicial reasoning, see
Golden and Makau.
"Paul Poe, et al. v. Ullman, Doe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 901, 81 S. Ct. Rp. 1752, 1961.
This case was overturned four years later in Criswofd v. Connecticut.
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Rhetorical Invention in Poev. Ullman
The majority opinion in this case is particularly revealing because the
Court's sixteen-paragraph opinion justifies a decision not to adjudicate. The
majority concluded that there was inadequate evidence to show demon
strable harm to any justiciable interests. This decision called for no admin
istration or enforcement. Nor did this opinion address itself to instructing
civilian behavior. Finally, the opinion did not directly serve to legitimize
governmental behavior. In short, this opinion was written to fulfill a purpose
or purposes not reducible to the first three functions of judicial opinions.
Yet the majority justices crafted argumentation to carefully justify their de
cision.
This opinion is also particularly relevant to a functional study of judicial
reasoning because it was written during a period of concern for the Court's
ultimate authority; the opinion was written only seven years after flrown.
The majority opinion begins predictably with a characterization of the
relevant facts. The Plaintiffs claimed that they had solicited contraceptive
advice from the physician in the case, who had not given it for fear of
prosecution. The statute reads as follows;
Any person who uses any drug, medicinal article or instrument for the pur
pose of preventing conception shall be fined not less than fifty dollars or
imprisoned not less than sixty days nor more than one year or be fined and
imprisoned.
There are no substantive provisions in this law dealing with the sale or
distribution of contraceptive devices, nor are there explicit provisions pro
hibiting the giving of information concerning the use of contraceptive de
vices. These activities are deemed to be involved legally only because of
Connecticut's general accessory enactment which holds:
Any person who assists, abets, counsels, hires, or commands another to com
mit any offense may be prosecuted and punished as if he were the principal
offender.
The Plaintiffs sought a Superior Court judgment declaring the Connect
icut ban unconstitutional. The Defendant, Connecticut's State Attorney,
claimed that he intended to prosecute any offenses against Connecticut
law. He added that the use of and giving of advice concerning contracep
tives would constitute such offenses. However, no one in Connecticut had
been prosecuted under the relevant statute.
The Superior Court admitted the matters of fact raised by the Plaintiffs
but found these facts insufficient for the Plaintiffs to proceed upon. The
Plaintiffs appealed to the Supreme Court of Errors^® which sustained the
Superior Court's demurrer by rendering a judgment of affirmance. The
Plaintiffs then appealed to the United States Supreme Court. Justice Frank
furter wrote the plurality opinion which dismissed the Plaintiffs' appeals.
The majority recognized that in this, as in every controversial case, the
audience's view of the relevant facts would influence the audience's eval
uation of the Court's satisfaction of Equity Law requirements. Given the
» Supreme Court of Errors, 147 Conn. 48, 166, A. 2D. 508.
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majority's ultimate decision not to decide this case, their characterization
of the facts would also serve to predispose audiences for or against the
belief that the decision was made with appropriate disinterest." Finally, fact
characterization in this, as in every Supreme Court opinion, helps predis
pose audiences for the belief that the Court has ruled in accordance with
its four-step model."
Accordingly, the majority opinion's opening narration is marked with em
phasis. For example, the majority use antithesis in paragraph one to em
phasize their view that the Plaintiffs' case lacks immediacy.
In proceedings seeking declarations of law, not on review of convictions for
violation of the statutes, that court has ruled that these statutes would be
applicable in the case of married couples.
Of course, no one familiar with the law need be told that these cases Involve
declaratory judgments rather than criminal proceedings. The use of antith
esis here—"in proceedings seeking declarations of law, not on review of
convictions for violations of statutes"—is exclusively argumentative; the ma
jority wish to emphasize the lack of serious harm to the Plaintiffs.
The Court follows this antithesis with expressions of compassion for the
"losing" side. In paragraph two, the majority note.
In view of the great emotional stress already suffered by the plaintiffs, the
probable consequence of another pregnancy is psychological strain ex
tremely disturbing to the physical and mental health of both husband and
wife.
This turn in the narration helps the majority credential themselves; though
they are aware of and concerned about the Plaintiffs' suffering, they are
bound by the lack of legal immediacy to rule against these litigants.
The majority next complete their summary narration of the relevant facts
with a redefinition of the Plaintiffs' interest.
Alleging irreparable harm and a substantial uncertainty of legal relations (a
local procedural requisite for a declaration), Plaintiffs ask a declaratory judg
ment that sections 53-32 and 54-196 are unconstitutional, in that they de
prive the Plaintiff's of life and liberty without due process of law.
The majority follow this narration of facts to the Poe case with two notably
less detailed paragraphs summarizing the facts relevant to the more emo
tionally charged Doe and Buxton cases. In this narration, the majority show
a stark awareness of these Plaintiffs' suffering—Mrs. Doe became severely
ill during her only pregnancy—while focusing on the lack of legal force
behind the Plaintiffs' claims.
Mrs. Doe, it is alleged, lives with her husband, they have no children; Mrs.
Doe recently underwent a pregnancy which induced in her a critical physical
Illness—two weeks' unconsciousness and a total of nine weeks' acute sick
ness which left her with partial paralysis, marked impairment of speech, and
" It is important to keep in mind that the Court is expected to rule with dis/nterest,
but not with a lack of interest. These radically different concepts are sometimes taken
as synonymous, thereby generating confusion among novice students of judicial prac
tice.
" For a detailed discussion of this model, see Golden and Makau.
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emotional instability. Another pregnancy would be exceedingly perilous to
her life. She, too, has consulted Dr. Buxton, who believes that the best and
safest treatment for her is contraceptive advice.
These paragraphs establish the majority's awareness of and concern for
the problems facing the Plaintiffs. These paragraphs also Illustrate the Court's
focus on the component of reasonableness, thus helping to create an image
of a majority appropriately driven by components of the judicial function.
The Court's audience have been directed in these paragraphs to perceive
the majority as compassionate but disinterested. This predisposition will play
an important role in preparing the readers for the majority's empirical ar
guments. This predisposition also plays an important role in counteracting
the possible effects resulting from the passionate minority opinions accom
panying the Court's opinion."
In paragraphs eight through sixteen, the majority use theoretical argu
ments regarding the judicial function and empirical arguments regarding
Connecticut law enforcement to explicate and to justify their conclusion
that the Court should not adjudicate this case on its merits. Preceding these
arguments, however, the majority include a redefinition of the lower court's
ruling. Here the majority replace their focus on the case's failure to meet
equity standards with an argument for the claim that the Plaintiffs in fact
face no threat of prosecution. According to the majority, there is a "tacit
agreement" between state officials and Connecticut citizens not to enforce
the relevant statute.
Following this empirical argument, the majority introduce the audience
to the major premise of the first of the opinion's overriding syllogisms.
If the appellants' claims to imminent threat of harm 'collide with plausibility,'
then these claims lack justlficability.
Predictably, the majority present an argument for affirmation of the an
tecedent and draw the consequent. Then, in paragraph nine of their opin
ion, the majority introduce the major premise of the second syllogism, that
the Court must limit its decision making to those cases involving clearly
justifiable claims. Now the majority have predisposed the audience to ac
cept the decision as obligatory; the majority cannot but decide not to ad
judicate this case on its merits.
To assure this audience response, the majority carefully argue that the
appellants' claims are "unrealistic." Thus, the majority opinion provides per
suasive support for the claim that the Court has ruled in accordance with
the dictates of the judicial function. The Justices have considered the facts
In relation to precedent; the justices have demonstrated concern for prin
ciples of justice and Fairness; the Justices have tempered their compassion
with adherence to principles of reason.
To further emphasize the degree to which they are ruling in accordance
with the dictates of good reason and fairness, the majority use paragraph
twelve to place their adversaries on the side of recklessness.
" For a comparison of the majority and minority narrations in this case, see Josina
M. Makau, "The Judicial Opinion as a Rhetorical Performance." {Doctoral Disserta
tion, University of California, Berkeley, 1979.)
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Whenever in pursuance of an honest and actual antagonistic assertion of
rights by one individual against another, there is presented a question in
volving the validity of any act of any legislature, State or Federal, and the
decision necessarily rests on the competency of the legislature to so enact,
the court must, in the exercise of its solemn duties, determine whether the
act be constitutional or not; but such an exercise of power is the ultimate
and supreme function of courts. It is legitimate only in the last resort, and
as a necessity in the determination of real, earnest, and vital controversy
between individuals.
Hence, the audience is asked to perceive the majority as painfully aware of
their "solemn" duties and diligently protective of the limits of their "legit
imate" powers. The audience is led to associate the majority with a sense
of responsibility, integrity, and vigilance against irresponsibility. These eth
ical appeals strike directly at the challenge that the Court's previous rulings
(such as those characterizing the desegregation cases) were the product of
a reckless, activist Court, unworthy of the Court's great authority. In short,
the Poe majority used carefully tailored argumentation to satisfy the most
important function served by their opinion; they fulfilled the expectations
of their composite audience with the goal of maintaining or increasing the
Court's authoritative image.^*
This interpretation of the Court's argumentation in Poe is supported by
the fact that the Poe majority's carefully tailored argument for self-restraint
was offered to an audience flooded with publicity regarding the Court's
alleged "overassertiveness" In cases involving desegregation and other con
troversial social issues.^'
This look at the operation of rhetorical invention in the Poe majority
opinion revealed that the Court's reasoning did much more than meet the
minimal justificatory demands posed by the Court's decision not to adju
dicate. Furthermore, this look at the language selected by the majority to
defend their decision went beyond even the minimal expectations of the
Court's composite audience in this case. Indeed, this case graphically illus
trates a more significant dimension of judicial reasoning as practiced by
Supreme Court justices placed in a vulnerable institutional context. The
primary function served by the Poe majority opinion is best understood in
terms of the opinion's fourth function. In Poe the justices used their argu
mentation to maintain and enhance the Court's authoritative image; that is,
to protect the Court's only "real" institutional power."
" For a discussion of the composite audience's expectations, see Golden and Mak-
au. See also, josina M. Makau, "The Supreme Court's Composite Audience: Norms
for Ethical Argumentation," presented at the 1982 Speech Communication Associa
tion National Convention, Louisville, KY.
At this point, even legal scholars began to question the Court's assertiveness. See,
for example, Arthur Miller and Ronald Howell, "The Myth of Neutrality in Consti
tutional Adjudication," 27 University of Chicago Law Review, 1960. Miller and Howell
argue that all Supreme Court decisions are made by fiat rather than by standards of
reasonableness or other principles appropriate to the judicial function.
" For a fascinating look at how Justices translate this concern for the Court's image
into majority and minority opinions, see Walter Murphy, Elements of ludicial Strategy
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964). Murphy reconstructs dialogues between
would-be dissenters, concurrers and their colleagues to demonstrate considerable
intra-tribunal concern for the Court's image.
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Now that we have completed our task of characterizing the four Institu
tional functions which govern the invention and evaluation of Supreme
Court majority opinions, we may evaluate the usefulness of the "new rhet
oric" theory of practical reasoning developed by Toulmin and Perelman in
the Supreme Court context. Specifically, we may attempt to apply the "new
rhetoric's" concept of argumentative intention to the institutional context
described above.
The "New Rhetoric's" Concept of Argumentative Intention
Both Perelman and Toulman distinguish between field-variant and field-
invariant features of argumentation. In his recent essay, "Logic and the Crit
icism of Arguments," Toulmin notes, for example.
Practical argumentation has both field invariant and field dependent fea
tures. Some topic terms (e.g., 'grounds' and 'warrants') have a use in most
fields of argument; more specialized terms (e.g., numerical 'probability') are
relevant only in very few fields. In between, a middle category of terms of
topical analysis—'kind' and 'degree,' 'fallacy' and 'analogy,' 'cause' and 'def
inition'—apply in varying ways as we move from one field to another."
Similarly, Perelman distinguishes between argumentation strategies ap
propriate for what he calls the "universal audience" and those appropriate
to given particular audiences. He notes that.
The nature of the audience to which arguments can be successfully pre
sented will determine to a great extent both the direction the arguments
will take and the character, the significance that will be attributed to them."
Perelman admonishes the critic accordingly,
A general rhetoric cannot be fixed by precepts and rules laid down, once
for all. But it must be able to adapt itself to the most varied circumstances,
matters and audiences."
Despite this admonition, however, Perelman repeatedly asserts the pre
cept that the goal of all argumentation is to gain or increase the adherence
of minds to a thesis or theses. In The New Rhetoric, he writes,
The goal of all argumentation, as we have said before, is to create or Increase
the adherence of minds to the theses presented for their assent."
Similarly, in "The Specific Nature of Juridical Proof," Perelman writes.
The object of this theory is the study of the discursive techniques that allow
one to bring about or increase the adherence of minds to the thesis that
one proposes for their assent.^^
Though Toulmin uses the term "functional" to discuss a critical perspec-
" Stephen Toulmin, "Logic and the Criticism of Argument," in James L. Golden,
Goodwin F. Berquist, and William E. Coleman, The Rhetoric of Western Thought, third
edition (Dubuque: Kendall/Hunt Publishing Co., 1983), in press.
" The New Rhetoric, p. 30.
"Chaim Perelman, "The New Rhetoric: A Theory of Practical Reasoning," Great
Books Yearbook, 24 (1973), 25.
The New Rhetoric, p. 45.
In Journal Des Tribanaux, 4255 (Brussels, Belgium, 1955), 101.
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tive which incorporates the rhetorical dimension of given documents, his
concept of function conforms more to the thesis model of intention de
scribed above than to the broader institutional sense discussed in this paper.
Touimin writes, for example,
The theory and techniques of rational criticism must be approached from
two complementary directions, formal and functional."
Yet in explicating his use of the term "functional" Touimin is careful to
focus on questions regarding the "right of relevant" argument for the "sub
stantive demands of the problem and situation." True to his training, Toui
min uses the term "function" primarily to discuss the rhetorical dimensions
relevant to intra-fextua/ criticism. He does not extend the sense to include
the broader extra-textual institutional purposes served by the given dis
course. As does Perelman, Touimin focuses primarily on the coherence of
and relevance of each step of a text leading finally to a claim or a set of
claims. Toulmin's adoption of the thesis model of argumentative intention
is even more readily apparent in his discussion of the "layout" of arguments.
Here, the claim is the end product of argumentation; it is the claim or set
of claims to which audience adherence is ultimately addresed."
The consequent "new rhetoric" precept that the goal of all argumenta
tion is to gain or increase adherence of minds to a thesis or theses has been
widely accepted by contemporary argumentation theorists. Indeed, outside
the circle of scholars associated with the "rhetoric-as-process" perspective,
the "thesis" model has been accepted as a commonplace.
This wide acceptance is most understandable in that the notion of thesis,
when translated loosely to mean theme or general conclusion, does seem
to allow enough flexibility to accommodate the goals of argumentation in
most settings.
However, leff and Mohrmann show in their analysis of Lincoln's "Cooper
Union Address" that the objective of campaign orations is best understood
in terms of "ingratiation," rather than thesis-adherence." Paul I. Rosenthal
demonstrates further in his essay on ethos and persuasion that different
contexts may help speakers achieve a variety of personal and non-personal
goals, not included in the "thesis" view of discourse.^® Because these authors
were concerned primarily with discourse not traditionally valued as "so
phisticated" or exemplary of the principles associated with reasonable ar
gument, theorists have heretofore assumed that these findings are inappro
priate to a discussion of "higher" forms of argumentation, or to the
understanding of argument paradigms.
However, a look at the operation of rhetorical operation in the Poe ma
jority opinion showed that the argumentation in at least one Supreme Court
majority opinion—written in response to the expectations of a highly so-
" "Logic and the Criticism of Arguments," in press.
" See, Uses of Argument, pp. 94-146.
"See, Michael C. Leff and Gerald P. Mohrmann, "Lincoln at Cooper Union: A
Rhetorical Analysis of the Text," The Quarterly Journal of Speech, 60:3 (October 1974),
348.
" Paul I. Rosenthal, "The Concept of Ethos and the Structure of Persuasion," Speech
Monographs, 33 (June 1966), 117-124.
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phisticated composite audience—was written primarily to improve the
Court's ethos. Thus, our functional analysis of judicial reasoning as practiced
shows that Leff, Mohrmann, and Rosenthal's findings are applicable In a
context as sophisticated as the Supreme Court context. This discovery leads
to the affirmation of our first claim, that the "new rhetoric" concept of
argumentative intention unnecessarily limits the applicability of this theory
in the judicial context.
This limitation may be overcome by Incorporating the functional com
ponent discussed in this paper into the "new rhetoric" theory of argumen
tation. Addition of this component maintains the integrity of the "new rhet
oric" theory," yet it permits the theory to better accommodate the needs
of the Supreme Court critic.
One argumentation perspective which currently includes such a func
tional conception of argumentative intention is the newly emerging "rhet
oric-as-process" perspective. However, as the following discussion will show,
other important components of the "rhetoric-as-process" perspective pre
vent this perspective's applicability in the Supreme Court context.
The "Rhetoric-as-Process" Perspective
Because this perspective has itself generated debate, it is difficult to suc
cinctly characterize its varied components. However, there are several es
sential concepts characteristic of this perspective. Whether defined nor-
matively or descriptively," the "rhetoric-as-process" perspective applies the
name "argument or arguing to the phenomena of one or more social actors
addressing symbolic appeals to others in an effort to win adherence."" This
perspective focuses on "arguing" as a "persuasive process."
Consistent with this perception of argument as process is the perspec
tive's concern with the social-political context in which argumentation oc
curs. Considerable attention is paid to the "natural rhetorical settings" in
which discourse occurs. This concern generates a highly useful conception
of institutional function. Indeed, as was suggested earlier, the "new rheto
ric" theory of argumentation would better accommodate the needs of Su
preme Court critics with the addition of the "rhetoric-as-process" concep
tion of argumentative function and goal.
Unlike the "new rhetoric" perspective, however, the "rhetoric-as-pro-
cess" perspective offers no place for the kinds of field-invariant rules char
acteristic of judicial reasoning." Furthermore, in its stress on "naturalistic"
" For example, the functional component described here is no way incompatible
with any aspect of the "new rhetoric" save the precept that the goal of all argumen
tation is reducible to a thesis or theses.
" See David Zarefsky, "Product, Process, or Point of View?" in Proceedings of the
Summer Conference on Argumentation, ed. Jack Rhodes and Sara Newel! (Speech
Communication Association and American Forensics Association, 1980), pp. 228-238
for a discussion of this distinction.
" Joseph Wenzel, "Perspectives on Argument," in Proceedings, p. 115.
" Some adherents of this view go so far as to question the usefulness of the concept
of an argument field. See, for example, Charles Arthur Willard, "Some Questions
About Toulmin's View of Argument Fields," in Proceedings, pp. 348-400. See also,
Ray McKerrow's response to Willard, "On Fields and Rational Enterprises: A Reply
to Willard," in Proceedings, pp. 401-413.
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argument, the "rhetoric-as-process" view holds rhetorical effectiveness (in
relation to a particular audience) as the singular appropriate evaluation cri
terion. As such, proponents of this theory do not leave room for norms
which may be institutionally generated, yet more rigorous than the "effec
tiveness" standard allows (such as those shared by members of the Supreme
Court's composite audience).
Interestingly, some adherents of the "rhetoric-as-process" perspective
are careful to reject the "new rhetoric" view that judicial reasoning may
serve as a useful model for practical argumentation.*" Yet even rejection of
the analogy between jurisprudential and other argumentation does not mit
igate against the fact that judicial argumentation, no matter how special, is,
at bottom, a legitimate form of argument.*^ Hence, theories of argumenta
tion which fail to be generalizable to the judicial context fail, in a significant
way, to serve our overall understanding of practical argumentation.
Perhaps the area of the "rhetoric-as-process" view most vulnerable to
this charge of non-generalizability is the perspective's attempt to make clear
distinctions between rhetoric, dialectic, and logic. In this view, rhetoric,
dialectic, and logic are categorized as focusing on process, procedure, and
product respectively. The "universal audience" is placed under the domain
of logic, while "explicit procedural rules" are placed under dialectic. "Im
personal explicators" are limited to the domain of logic, as are "explicit
inferential rules."*^
Our discussion of judicial strategies directly challenges these distinctions
between dialectic, rhetoric and logic. For example, discussion of judicial
invention demonstrated that judicial argumentation is addressed to an au
dience having much in common with the "universal audience." This com
posite audience is not adequately understood as a "typical" particular au
dience whose adherence will be gained through strategies usually associated
with "naturalistic" argument. Yet, as Golden and Makau show, "each step
of the judicial reasoning process—from characterization of the facts to jus
tification of the decision—rests squarely in the domain of rhetoric."*^ The
"rhetoric-as-process" fails to allow for this overlap.
Furthermore, this paper has shown that the "effectiveness" standard in
the judicial context must include close attention to adherence to "explicit
procedural rules," "explicit inferential rules," and at least the impression of
an "impersonal explicator." Yet the "rhetoric-as-process" theory restricts
these argumentative components to the domain of dialectic, rather than
See, for example, Willard, "Some Questions About Toulmin's View of Argument
Fields." Though his position is more "middle-ground," Michael Osborn suggests a
relevant justification for a reluctance to accept Supreme Court reasoning as paradig
matic. According to Osborn, judicial argumentation at this level may be a "mixed
mode which operates on the border between practical and perfected reasoning."
Thus, perhaps we "must strain a great deal to make Supreme Court reasoning rep
resentative of the great center of practical reasoning." In the Introduction to Explo
rations, p. xxii.
** See Golden and Makau for a detailed discussion of the practical/rhetorical nature
of judicial reasoning.
« See Wenzel for a concise explication of these distinctions. Wenzel offers a par
ticularly useful table on page 124.
*' Golden and Makau, p. 172.
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rhetoric. On this view, judicial argumentation would simply not fit into the
domain of rhetoric. Thus, the "rhetoric-as-process" view runs counter to
the finding of previous studies that every step of the judicial reasoning
process falls well within the domain of rhetoric.
In short, though the "rhetoric-as-process" theory's attention to the social
context in which argumentation occurs offers an important functional com
ponent absent in the "new rhetoric" perspective, other precepts of the
"rhetoric-as-process" perspective limit the overall applicability of this per
spective in the Supreme Court context.
In contrast, when accompanied by the functional component described
in this essay, the "new rhetoric" perspective effectively accommodates the
needs of the critic faced with Supreme Court argumentation. As such this
expanded version of the "new rhetoric" theory of argumentation promises
to enrich our understanding of the nature and scope of all argumentation.
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GOOD TALKERS AND THE
FOUR COMMANDMENTS
Craig Pinkus
"The time has come," the Walrus said,
"to talk of many things..
Lewis Carroll (Charles Lutwidge Dodgson)
The Walrus and the Carpenter, St. 11
I found myself at the ripe old age of thirty-one seated in a room of marble
columns and maroon colored heavy drapery. A pair of crossed quill pens
were on the mahogany desk in front of me, and I was watching a person
standing behind a lectern which had red and white lights attached to it. The
red light had been turned on. That meant that in a couple of minutes, after
the people in front of me cleared away their papers and walked out of the
room, I would be moving up one row of benches where I would be seated
a mere two feet from the face of a still athletic looking man who was once
called "Whizzer."
It was the first time I found myself in this particular situation, and I was
going to try to persuade the nine people sitting in front of me that the First
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States was a legal provision
that extended all the way down to the comparatively lowly status of high
school students. Since I had won at the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals,
I was spared the difficulty of having to make what we used to call the first
affirmative speech.
The lady who was giving the first affirmative was so nervous that she
dropped her diamond encrusted wristwatch in a tumbler of water as she
was trying to sit down after her argument. She had removed the wristwatch
to better keep track of time during the argument, but the maneuver failed.
After the watch hit the water, some of the water hit me.
Rising from my chair, I moved the few inches to the left necessary to be
directly in front of the lectern. Following time honored custom I began
"Mr. Chief Justice and members of the Court." So far so good. Then, since
I had just been sprayed with water and the situation seemed somewhat
amusing, I said "It seems that this subject is somewhat less dry than prece
dent would suggest."
No one smiled.
Not even Justice Douglas. It dawned on me that I was in trouble. Fortu
nately, however, I had been through this sort of reaction before. Standing
Craig Pinkus is a member of the Mitchell Hurst Pinkus Jacobs & Dick law
firm, Indianapolis, Indiana. This paper was presented to Nicholas McKinney
Cripe on the occasion of his retirement from teaching at the annual con
vention of the Central States Speech Communication Association, Lincoln,
Nebraska, April 9, 1983. Copyright 1983 Craig Pinkus. Citation for scholarly
purposes must refer to the occasion of this essay's public presentation.
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here now I can recall many a day when Mike McCee and I thought that
one of us had just said something terribly clever, but were forced to notice
that the other four people in the room were not smiling. Our opponents
naturally would not think anything we said was worthy of positive response.
That left a student timekeeper who was dutifully watching the sweepsecond
hand on a Timex and flipping over cards with numbers on them—often
upside down. And, of course, a person called a judge. Something about the
word "judge" seems to transform an otherwise ordinary or even amiable
human being into a dour faced, impatient sufferer.
At any rate, there I was. It actually was the Supreme Court of the United
States, and I had to say something. Like a boxer who had just found out
how good Sugar Ray Leonard really was, I got back on my feet by reflex—
not volition. The reflex was in the nature of a mantra which I call in this
paper the Four Commandments. They popped into my head, it cleared, and
before I knew it things were going pretty well.
As you can guess, I picked up the Four Commandments while going
through the boot camp known as Mac Cripe's intercollegiate debate team.
For four years I heard the Four Commandments, and I'm glad that I did. If
you don't know what they are, this talk may have some small value. If you
do know what they are, you may enjoy it anyway.
One of the rules of the United States Supreme Court provides as follows:
Oral argument should undertake to emphasize and clarify the written ar
gument appearing in the briefs theretofore filed. Counsel should assume
that all Members of the Court have read the briefs in advance of argument.
The Court looks w'ah disfavor on any oral argument that is read from a prepared
text.'
They take this business very seriously, and, of course, they should. Mr.
justice Brennan once explained what I was doing in front of that lectern as
follows:
... Oral argument is the absolutely indispensable ingredient of appellate
advocacy ... [Ojften my whole notion of what a case is about crystalizes at
oral argument. This happens even though I read the briefs before oral ar
gument; indeed, that is the practice now of all the members of the Supreme
Court... often my idea of how a case shapes up is changed by oral argument
... oral argument with us is a Socratic dialogue between justices and coun
sel.^
No matter what you may have heard about the importance of precedent
in our legal system, the Supreme Court is a branch of government, not just
a court. The justices want reasoning, not authority, as the basis of the ar
guments presented to them. They want to find the correct decision as a
matter of principle, not solely as a matter of precedent.^
And, no matter what you may have heard about lawyers. Supreme Court
justices ask questions in straightforward English. They want advocates stand
ing before them who use the same language, and my impression is that the
' Rules of the Supreme Court of the United States, Rule 38.1.
' Harvard Law School, Occasional Pamphlet No. 9 (1967), p. 22-23.
' Stern & Cressman, Supreme Court Practice (4th Ed. 1969), p. 500.
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educational system does not contribute much toward the production of
such advocates.
Although there is no shortage of lawyers, I believe there is a shortage of
people who know what to do in front of courts. I am not alone. Consider
the following remarks:
Use plain English. You know, do not speak that bastard dialect of the lan
guage spoken only by lawyers. If you mean "before" say "before," not "prior."
And if you mean "after" say "after," not "subsequent." And if you mean
"car" say "car," not "motor vehicle." Cot it?
Now, everybody has heard that and everybody has written it down innu
merable times in notes, but ail of us offend on that score from lime to time
for the simple reason that all of us have been to law school, and law school
is three years of intensive practice at distorting the English language. You
have got to learn to speak and think like a lawyer and that's not the way to
try cases.*
Law school undoubtedly deserves part of the blame, but there was once
a wonderful training ground that helped to insulate law students from the
contagion. I fear that the training ground has now been lost. It's what used
to be intercollegiate debate. You remember, the place where I learned the
Four Commandments.
When McCee, Bill Neher, Priscilla Thomas, Carl Flaningam and I were all
slugging it out on the debate circuit during our respective years at Butler,
we were taught to talk to people. We all had the jaunty example of an
enthusiastic advocate who relished something called "clash," and deplored
events characterized as "two ships passing in the night." You know what
I'm talking about. Two debate teams in the same room at the same time but
oblivious to the others' presence. And, we were all taught the Four Com
mandments.
We weren't taught the only possible way to communicate by speaking.
Mike McGee's paper has reminded us of the "silent whisper" which I sus
pect would be very hard to learn. Carl Flaningam has reminded us of the
beginnings of political soapsuds—a technique which we probably could,
but not necessarily would want, to emulate. Because of the remoteness from
my own experience, the portrait painted by Bill Neher is less vivid, and yet
I feel 1 know the unsuccessful campaigner he described for us. Any of us
might make use of Mr. Gichuchi's appeals.
Each paper tells us about an attempt to persuade people by talking to
them. In today's world of corporate merchandising, the label on Mr. Gi
chuchi's package would say "War Hero." And as happens even to corporate
merchandisers, it didn't sell.
Ex-president Nixon, sans sweat and stubble, was marketing himself under
the trademark "Good Guy Politics." With the "Checkers" speech, he had
at least one successful season. And FDR, of course, had an almost unending
string of successful seasons as he headed up the longest running series in
his business, the original "Father Knows Best."
Those people are the kind of people McGee and I used to call "good
talkers." We'd be between rounds, or talking over dinner at night, about
* Irving Younger, "The Art of Advocacy," Advocacy in (he 80's (1980), p. 38.
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this team or that team, and every once in a while one of them would receive
the accolade. Yup, they were good talkers. And that's what we wanted to
be, too.
Somehow it has changed. In my last couple of years of debate, I came
across a few teams whose speakers talked so rapidly I found it difficult to
understand them. I left college thinking that such teams were only occa
sional aberrations. When I got to law school, I found it full of people I had
debated against in college. And they were all good talkers. But I also had
the experience of judging a few debate tournaments at Harvard, and I began
to grow uneasy.
More and more teams were talking faster and faster. In my critique, I
would tell them that such rapid speech failed to communicate, failed to
persuade, and left me tired and confused. I always held up the next round
because I was so busy lecturing the people I had just judged. They seemed
to take my words seriously, but I think they were only concerned about not
offending me so that their chances for a winning score would not be harmed.
After I started practicing law, I had the experience of judging moot court
competition teams. That's when I started thinking it was all over. Moot court
teams are usually judged by lawyers and people who are real life judges,
and they want people to talk to them, not at them. They want to understand
the reasoning, they want to know the facts. They want a cogent and per
suasive explanation about why one side or the other should prevail. They
want to hear good talkers. Instead, they are assaulted by a form of noise
pollution that seems to emanate from 3 by 5 cards.
1 found myself wondering if the Vietnam experience had led debaters to
believe that card counts were somehow like body counts. I wondered if the
moot court competitors in law school were former debaters. They were. I
suddenly realized that what I was witnessing was a video game of the mouth.
As far as I could tell, it was an exercise which would provide good training
for only two occupations: becoming an auctioneer and making Federal Ex
press commercials. And that's all.
I admit to viewing intercollegiate debate, and virtually all speech training
and competition, from a consumer's point of view, i must tell you that from
that standpoint, debate today is a consumer fraud. Rightly or wrongly, I
grew up viewing debate as vocational education for future politicians, dip
lomats, lawyers, and the like. It took me years to accept the fact that what
is going on is actually happening.
At a Butler Homecoming a few years ago, I cornered Mac and demanded
to know what had happened to intercollegiate debate. That conversation
was the last time I posed the question, but I resolved to find some oppor
tunity to talk about it. I can think of no better occasion than one which
honors so excellent a teacher and model. I would like to appeal to those of
you who have the opportunity to do something about what happens in this
field, and my appeal is that you honor the contributions of my debate coach
by finding a way of preserving the kind of training for young people that
he taught so well.
I am not qualified to give proper respect to all of the things Mac Cripe
has accomplished. I know that I must be neglecting quite a bit. But his career
as a teacher and coach of young people trying to learn how to speak and
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reason on their feet met one of the great needs of our society. We must
have people who understand and make use of the simple fundamentals of
good communication such as what I call Mac's Four Commandments.
Before sitting down I suppose I should mention what they are, obvious
as they are. A thousand times or more Mac Gripe said to me "Pinkus, you
know what you did wrong don't you?" "No, Mac, I don't." "You didn't
name it. Then explain it. Then prove it. And conclude It."
And even though I knew I hadn't done it, I often argued that I did. When
I was standing there before the Supreme Court, and in the years since that
time, however, I've always been glad I knew the difference.
Thanks, Mac.
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DIALECTIC INQUIRY: THE NEED FOR THE
FORENSIC COMMUNITY'S INVOLVEMENT
William M. Strickland
The disciplinary nature of American education has produced somewhat
parochial thought, with individual fields of study developing their own jar
gon and rarely communicating with others even when significant areas of
common interest exist. Business, much to its credit, has recently turned to
philosophy for a "new" method in solving problems. This new method.
Dialectic Inquiry (D.I.), is supposedly "the application of debate strategies
and techniques to managerial decision making."^
In the development of the D.I. system, business educators did not turn
to the group with the most experience and training in the clash of ideas. It
appears that the forensic community has had no impact on the shaping of
this process. Without the guidance of debate coaches, the business com
munity has reinvented an inferior wheel. Of course, the concept of debate
as a decision-making tool is an excellent one; it does, however, need sig
nificant changes from the present D.I. approach.
Debate in the corporate boardroom is an area in which speech commu
nication professionals should be involved. The involvement could be in the
areas of theory, research, and consulting. This essay is designed to facilitate
that involvement by 1) examining Dialectic Inquiry, 2) offering a modified
intercollegiate debate format for business decision making (Structured Cross-
Examination Policy Debate), 3) comparing SCEPD to D.I., and 4) discussing
the ultimate role of the forensic expert.
Dialectic Inquiry
There is presently a small core of articles dealing with D.l.^ All of the
studies (field as well as laboratory) come from the same philosophical base.^
Richard O. Mason explains this common view.
In this dialectical design we are following a scheme suggested by Church
man's interpretation of Hegel. Here the plan (thesis) is opposed by the coun-
William M. Strickland is Assistant Professor of Speech at the University of
South Carolina.
' Lyle Sussman, "Dialectic Problem Solving and Management Decisions: The State
of the Literature," Speech Communication Association Convention, November 1982,
p. 1.
'For the clearest explanation of the D.I. process see: Lyle Sussman and Richard
Herden, "Dialectical Problem Solving," Susiness Horizons (January-February 1982) 66-
71; Richard O. Mason, "A Dialectical Approach to Strategic Planning," Management
Science, 15 (1969), B403-B414; Ian I. Mitroff and Ralph H. Kilmann, "Teaching Man
agers to Do Policy Analysis: The Case of Corporate Bribery," California Management
Review, 20 (1977), 47-54; and Ian I. Mitroff and James R. Emshoff, "On Strategic
Assumption-Making: A Dialectical Approach to Policy and Planning," Academy of
Management Review 4 (1979), 1-12.
' C. W. Churchman, The Design of Inquiring Systems: Basic Concepts of Systems and
Organization (New York; Basic Books, 1971).
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terplan (antithesis) both of which are constructed and argued for from the
same databank (the essence). Hegel's theory leads us to predict that the
manager—observer of conflict—will integrate and form a new and expanded
world view (the synthesis). The synthesis includes exposing hidden assump
tions and developing a new conceptualization of the planning problem the
organization faces.'
The available literature persuasively presents the philosophical reasons for
the value of D.I. as a tool; however, the empirical evidence Is inconsistent
in proving the real-world advantages of the method. The inconsistency of
results comes from the very limited agreement as to what type of problems
are best suited for D.I. and what format should be used.
Primarily, D.I. has generally been viewed as an appropriate tool for solving
ill-structured problems. Mitroff and Kilmann believe, "Ill-structured prob
lems ... are (a) hard to define, (b) conflict producing, and (c) not generally
amenable to standardized solution techniques."^ Thus, ill-defined problems
"tend not to be independent of either the personality or the background
of the particular decision maker" and "analysts of different persuasion and
background will tend to define the same problem in very different ways."®
Obviously, problems will be more or less ill-structured and not clearly ill-
or well-structured. Therefore, the type of problem used in a study will affect
results. The less than glowing results of D.I. reported by Cosier^ have been
criticized for applying "both the criteria and the method developed for and
appropriate to well-structured problems to a method that was expressly
developed for treating ill-structured problems."® The criticism goes on to
say, "it is not a test of the value of dialectical inquiry to give two or more
already formulated world views, plans, or policies to a set of judges for their
subsequent evaluation."' Guidelines for what type of problems are best
suited for debate are clearly needed.
Lyie Sussman in "Dialectic Problem Solving and Management Decisions:
The State of the Literature" identifies another difficulty in judging results.
He writes, "One argument that can be leveled against all twelve studies
reviewed is that the procedures followed in constructing the DA [Devil's
Advocate] and Dl [Dialectic Inquiry] treatment are somewhat vague."'"' The
lack of details in the description of the format and procedures used does
make comparisons difficult. But even more important is the inconsistency
in presentational methods and structure. Various studies have used written
presentations, others oral; some have examined structured debates, others
unstructured. The real harm of this procedural variety is that the value of
debate is being questioned as a decision-making tool.
In understanding how D.I. is practiced, one should remember that while
there are considerable differences in specific approaches, all D.I. studies
' Mason, B408.
' Mitroff and Kilmann, 47.
® Ibid., 48,
' R. A. Cosier, "Dialectic Inquiry in Strategic Planning: A Case of Premature Accep
tance?" Academy of Management Review, 6 (1981), 643-648.
" Ian I. Mitroff and Richard O. Mason, "The Metaphysics of Policy and Planning: A
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revolve around thesis, antithesis, and synthesis. One set of assumptions is
challenged by an opposite set of assumptions in order to reach a new view.
D.I. decisions are usually then tested against an expert (E.) presenting only
one side of an issue and a devil's advocate (D.A.) who argues against the
expert but does not defend a position. In other words, three groups make
decisions using D.I., D.A., and E. methods of investigation. Thus far, the D.A.
method appears to be the most effective.
Structured Cross-Examination Policy Debate
A modified intercollegiate debate format should prove more useful in
making business decisions than any of the present Dialectic Inquiry ap
proaches. This format. Structured Cross-Examination Policy Debate (SCEPD),
will be familiar to the debate community and, thus, give the business com
munity a large number of qualified individuals to call for assistance. An
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Such a procedure should prove to be a forward step in using debate in the
corporate boardroom.
Comparison
The following comparison of D.I. and SCEPD is not designed to refute the
Hegelian approach, for it has the potential of adding a valuable tool to
business decision making. The essay is intended to extend, apply, alter, and
structure the method in order to clarify and gain additional advantages. The
first step in this effort is to examine the process in terms of the differences
implied by their titles.
The word dialectic is dropped from SCEPD because of fear of confusion
between classical dialectic (as presented by Plato and explained by Aristotle)
and the Hegelian view of dialectic. The term cross-examination is substi
tuted for dialectic because it is generally known as the dialectic procedure
used in our legal system. In addition, cross-examination is an excellent tool
not used in the recent Hegel/Churchman approach. True, classical dialectic
is a process of questioning the opposition and serves as an immediate and
direct check. Dialectic Inquiry (note the capital letters) really is an uninter
rupted non-direct check. The devil's advocate system (often presented as
an alternative to D.I.) also does not call for immediate and direct questions
and answers. Thus, the D.I./D.A. approaches lose the fundamental principle
"for the solution of all disputed problems." That is, "Both premises and
inferences of each side must at all times be subject to the scrutiny of the
opposition. Continuous, uninterrupted discourse is not favorable to this."''
The highly respected jurist, Henry Wigmore, indicated the value of cross-
examination: "it is beyond doubt the greatest legal machine ever invented
for the discovery of truth.""
Debate is used as a substitute for inquiry because it implies the dual-sided
nature of the search; additionally, it is more descriptive of the process.
Debate also gives the impression of uninterrupted oral presentations of
conflicting contentions, assumptions, and issues. Further, the word debate
brings to mind the need for rhetorical skill. The D.I. advocates have thus
far basically ignored rhetorical skills (written or oral) necessary to present
the most effective case.
By calling our procedure debate instead of dialectic, we remove the He-
" Everett Lee Hunt, "Dialectic: A Neglected Method of Argument," Quarter/y ^ our-
nal of Speech Educators, 7 (1921), 221.
" Raymond S. Beard, "A Comparison of Classical Dialectic, Legal Cross-Examina-
tion, and Cross Question Debate," Journal of the American Forensic Association, 3
(1966), 55.
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gcllan burden of countering every tfiesis \vith its opposite or counter thesis.
This small step gives those opposed to the thesis a great deal more flexibility
in argumentation strategy. This can be seen clearly by viewing a military
general's decision to attack. The advocates of D.I. might have the counter
thesis: "we should retreat." They would counter the assumptions that the
enemy is weak with the argument that the enemy is strong, the assumption
that we are strong with one asserting we are weak, and the assumption that
the weather will be sunny with a strong prediction of rain. The truth of the
argument could be that the forces are equal in strength, that the weather
will be cloudy, and that the general's forces should not attack. By forcing
the defense of the counter thesis, the opposition must argue rhetorically
inferior arguments and appear as unreliable as those arguing for the attack
thesis. In a debate the opposition can argue the counter thesis, but it has
the flexibility to advance any position which will defeat the thesis. Those
advocating D.I. limit the contentions, issues, arguments, and, thus, limit the
search for truth.
Further, the word policy has been added because policy questions (what
should we do) are the most important area of business decisions. Questions
of fact and value have relevance only in relationship to how they affect
action and with such relevance become issues of a policy debate. In other
words, someone advocating a plan to increase profits can have issues of fact
(cost, distribution, personnel, etc.) presented against him as well as having
to contend with the value question of the desirability of increased profits,
limiting business debates to policy topics does not preclude the introduc
tion of arguments of fact and value because such issues often have signifi
cant bearing on matters of policy.
The most basic change from D.I. to Structured Cross-Examination Policy
Debate is the adding of "structure." Thus far, D.I. advocates have been very
vague as to what procedures are followed in their methodology and have
offered only limited guidelines for conducting a D.I. While we offer a highly
structured debate procedure, we are not offering the procedure. SCEPD
could and often should be adapted to the individual policy problem, but
an overall structure is essential.
The need for a structure comes from the recognition (something D.I.
advocates appear not to realize when testing E./D.I./D.A. approaches) that
business decision makers use dialectic inquiry (lower case), cross-examina
tion, debate, argumentation, and rhetoric now. It is indeed naive to believe
that the strategic planners in American business do not have and do not
use these skills. The advantage then must come from increased effectiveness
and a guarantee that they will be more widely utilized. The structure of the
debate does just that. A debate structure also has the advantage of giving
structure to an ill-defined problem and, thus, a structure for decision mak
ing.
While the comparison of Dialectic Inquiry and Structured Cross-Exami
nation Policy Debate clearly indicates major differences, those familiar with
academic debate can see additional procedural advantages. The first and
most obvious is the structuring of the format around decision issues. Round
I, for example, focuses the debate on need and inherency issues and re
quires a decision before the discussion can continue. The three-round ap-
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proach forces business decision makers to think in terms of policy making
criteria. The format also incorporates debate concepts, such as resolution,
plan, presumptions, burden of proof, feasibility, workability, and disadvan
tages, which are all important in policy decisions.
The danger of SCEPD is that it could be viewed as a game. It is not.
Millions of dollars and careers of individuals could easily be affected by a
debate in a corporate boardroom. To try and teach business managers to
be academic debaters could only produce frustration and ultimate rejection
of SCEPD, for debate procedures are of no interest to business unless they
help produce better decisions. The debate should be approached as a pro
cess which gives a clearer picture of truth and not a win/lose situation for
the affirmative and negative.
Role of the Forensic Expert
The first and most obvious role of a forensic expert in the development
of SCEPD for business decision making would be as a consultant. Inherent
in the suggested format is debate theory not known by the business com
munity. The forensic consultant may need to explain concepts such as res
olution, plan, development of need, presumption, inherency, plan attacks,
extension of arguments, cross-examination, and overall debate strategy. The
consultant could easily be responsible for coaching both the affirmative and
negative in order to have the best debate possible.
A consultant might even be hired to be the debater for both sides. This
situation would require affirmative and negative speeches by the consultant
and cross-examination by another consultant or the business' management.
Another area of involvement for the forensic expert would be in the
development of theory. This could involve an expansion or modification of
SCEPD. Questions, such as whether a debate should be stopped after Round
I  if a need is not demonstrated, whether plan spikes are appropriate for
business debate, whether debaters should be selected on the basis of in
volvement with a topic, and whether time limits should be set, need to be
examined. A clear theoretical base for debate in the corporate boardroom
could be a major contribution to the making of business decisions.
The forensic expert might also find rewarding the empirical testing of
SCEPD, D.I., or D.A. Thus far, as indicated earlier, results have been incon
sistent. Also there are numerous areas in which no studies have been con
ducted. Herden emphasized this point in his paper "Argument and Man
agement Decision—What We Need to Know." He writes.
Table 1 summarizes the 14 research questions posed in this paper. These
questions are by no means exhaustive yet they dramatically indicate the
narrow focus of past research. What is needed is both a broader focus which
encompasses more elements of the process as well as more in-depth analysis
of each element. This is only possible if a number of disciplines collaborate
to contribute their own unique knowledge and world views to the under
standing of such a complex system.''
" Richard P. Herden, "Argument and Management Decisions—What We Need to
Know," Speech Communication Association Convention {November 1982), p. 8.
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Conclusion
The business community is now interested in developing a system which
will generate opposite world views in order to make better decisions. Di
alectic Inquiry is a step in that direction, but it does not appear to incor
porate many of the advantages of true dialectic or scholastic debate. The
forensic expert's involvement is needed if debate in the corporate board
room is to reach its full potential.
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